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Walsh: Extraterritorial Confusion: The Complex Relationship Between Bow

EXTRATERRITORIAL CONFUSION: THE
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BOWMAN AND MORRISON AND A REVISED
APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Ramzi Yousef planted a “test bomb” aboard an international
flight from the Philippines to Japan.1 During a layover, Yousef
disembarked the plane.2 On the second leg of the flight, the test bomb
detonated successfully, resulting in the death of a Japanese passenger
and the injury of several other innocent civilians.3
Authorities eventually detained Yousef, and an investigation
indicated that the test bomb was practice for a more devious plan, in
which Yousef intended to place similar bombs onboard several United
States-bound commercial aircraft.4 Yousef was extradited to the United
States and found guilty of planting and detonating the bomb on the
Yousef challenged this conviction,
Philippine commercial flight.5
questioning how he could be charged for a bombing that took place
wholly outside of the United States in which none of the victims were
U.S. citizens or residents.6 The United States’s answer to his challenge
was extraterritoriality.7

United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003). In preparation for this
bombing, Yousef and several other co-conspirators bombed a movie theater in Manila,
resulting in the injury of several patrons. Id. at 79.
2
Id. at 81. Yousef exited the plane during a layover in Cebu, another city located in the
Philippines. Id.
3
Id. at 79.
4
See id. at 81–82, 110 (“The bombing of the Philippine Airlines flight at issue in Count
Nineteen, which killed one Japanese national and maimed another, was merely a test-run
that Yousef executed to ensure that the tactics and devices the conspirators planned to use
on United States aircraft operated properly.”).
5
Id. at 80, 82. Yousef was convicted and found guilty of other offenses as well,
including the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Id. at 79–80.
6
Id. at 88. For this crime, Yousef was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 32(b), which
allows for the prosecution of those placing bombs on foreign, civilian aircraft regardless of
where the act is committed. Id. § 32(b) prescribes jurisdiction over foreign offenders if they
are “found within the United States.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)). Yousef argued that he
was not “found in the United States” but was instead extradited against his will for the
perpetration of other crimes; however, the court found the extradition was sufficient to
fulfill this requirement. Id. at 88, 90.
7
Id. at 87–88. Extraterritoriality is the exercise of enforcing a law beyond a nation’s
boundaries. See infra note 9 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of
extraterritoriality). While 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) explicitly prescribes extraterritoriality, Yousef
challenged such extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 91. The court found jurisdiction proper
under the protective principle of international law. Id. at 91–92.
1
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Traditionally, the United States has combated some forms of
international conduct by giving extraterritorial effect to some federal
laws.8 Extraterritoriality, the exercise of enforcing a law beyond national
boundaries, is by no means a new issue; however, it is one that has
garnered some attention as of late.9 In the last twenty years, the world
has become more global, and it is common for the substance of many
crimes to have connections in more than one country.10 However,
extraterritoriality regularly results in an encroachment upon another
nation’s sovereignty.11
The United States’s treatment of extraterritoriality is inconsistent.12
The United States, in its early beginnings, appeared to foster

See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 94–166, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 7 (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
94-166.pdf (explaining how the “nature and purpose of a statute” may call for it to apply
extraterritorially); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 111–14 (2010) (discussing the
United States’s use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish crimes abroad that have a
harmful effect on the nation). Throughout this Note, I will be using the term
“geoambiguous” to characterize laws that are nondescript in their extraterritorial reach. I
have borrowed this term from Professor Jeffrey A. Meyer’s article, Dual Illegality and
Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law. Id. at 114.
9
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 122–24 (discussing how the development of international
organizations, borders, and legal norms leads to an inevitable increase in extraterritorial
conduct). Extraterritorially applying laws to combat heinous conduct does not always
result in an international uproar, but is nevertheless a contentious issue. See Anthony J.
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1048–49 (2011)
(discussing the controversial extraterritorial extension of federal statutes by Congress).
Extraterritoriality is especially controversial when it is prescribed unilaterally or when a
federal statute is silent on its geographic scope. Id. This Note focuses solely on the United
States’s approach to extraterritoriality. A comparative analysis with other nations is
beyond the scope of this Note.
10
See Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the TwentyFirst Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 592 (2007)
(discussing how the world has become increasingly interconnected, resulting in what
President George H.W. Bush described as a type of “new world order”).
11
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (discussing the
importance of sovereignty and the ability of nations to govern their own laws).
Extraterritorial jurisdiction can encroach upon a nation’s sovereignty and deny a nation its
full rights. Id. Extraterritoriality is often seen as a controversial means of enforcing foreign
policy. See Charles Tait Graves, Extraterritoriality and Its Limits: The Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 715, 716 (1998) (explaining that
extraterritoriality is recognized in limited contexts). See generally Jordan J. Paust, The
Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanactions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV.
1535 (2009) (highlighting some of the controversial tactics that the Bush administration
used to gain jurisdiction over alleged terrorists).
12
John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. U. L.
REV. 635, 640 (2011). Such an inconsistency makes the standards of overcoming the
presumption against extraterritoriality difficult to define. Meyer, supra note 8, at 164.
8
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international law and restrained its use of extraterritoriality.13 This
approach changed in the 1920s, and courts suddenly became more lax in
allowing laws, particularly criminal laws, to apply extraterritorially.14
But the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd. appears to reinforce a strict presumption against
extraterritoriality.15 It seems that the only thing consistent is the courts’
inability to effectively define and manage the limitations of
extraterritoriality.16
The emergence of new global issues has brought the presumption
against extraterritoriality under fire.17 Crimes are becoming more
intricate and complex, and continual developments call for the United
States to alter the way it applies federal laws extraterritorially.18 To
13
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(construing the Charming Betsy canon, which states that “an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”); see
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“All legislation is prima facie
territorial.” (quoting Ex parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499
(1859); People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596)). The Charming Betsy doctrine states
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.” Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. The Charming Betsy
doctrine is considered an early example of a presumption against extraterritoriality. John
H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 371 (2010).
14
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (allowing the government to
protect itself from obstruction of fraud by using extraterritorial application). Bowman has
consistently been the precedent used to apply laws extraterritorially. See Zachary D.
Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law After Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 167 & n.125 (2011) (discussing
cases and situations that cite Bowman in order to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction).
15
See 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
16
See Knox, supra note 12, at 650 (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment
of the presumption against extraterritoriality).
17
See Stephen I. Adler, Comment, Fighting Terrorism in the New Age: A Call for
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Terrorists, 18 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 171, 173–74 (2006) (discussing
emerging global issues that may become problematic for the United States). Because of
heightened dangers within modern society, including the war on drugs and war on terror,
some individuals have called for lighter restraints on the United States’s approach to
extraterritoriality. Id.
18
See Phillip R. Trimble, Commentary, The Supreme Court and International Law: The
Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 57 (1995) (asserting that, as
technology advances, government regulation of private behavior is imperative). Paul
Schiff Berman has noted:
[T]he growth of global communications technologies, the rise of
multinational corporate entities with no significant territorial center of
gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean
that many jurisdictions will feel effects of activities around the globe,
leading inevitably to multiple assertions of legal authority over the
same act, without regard to territorial location.
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007).
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properly combat such issues without overstepping congressional
authority, this Note endorses a new approach to extraterritorially
applying federal laws—one that allows the United States to adequately
maintain national security and combat criminal offenses that specifically
target the United States and its citizens while simultaneously minimizing
unexpressed statutory interpretations and encroachment on the
sovereignty of other nations.
This Note first discusses the meaning, history, and development of
extraterritoriality within the United States.19 Second, this Note analyzes
the treatment of the presumption against extraterritoriality, why its
application reflects courts’ public policy concerns, and why international
principles of law have been abused, resulting in increased extraterritorial
Finally, this Note provides a solution to
interpretation.20
extraterritoriality by endorsing a Modified-Exception Test, which
emphasizes national security and promotes a clear statement, literal
reading of statutes while providing an exception for extraterritorial
application.21
II. BACKGROUND
Extraterritoriality is a beneficial means of governmental assertion of
authority over international conduct that causes domestic harm.22 Part
II.A first discusses statutory construction and the definition of
extraterritoriality, as well as the traditional approaches to interpreting
the extraterritorial reach of geographically silent statutes.23 Second, Part
II.B provides the history of extraterritorial application of federal laws
that are silent in their territorial scope.24 Finally, Part II.C discusses the
current state of extraterritoriality.25
See infra Part II (discussing the background and history of extraterritoriality).
See infra Part III (explaining why the Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. is facially a strong policy, but fails to foster
consistent, predictable results).
21
See infra Part IV (creating a new test that balances the approaches of Morrison and
Bowman while giving full consideration to the conduct in question and the contemplation
of the actor).
22
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (noting that the government has
the right to protect itself and its property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 33(1) (1965) (noting the state’s ability to protect itself from threats to its
security).
23
See infra Part II.A (explaining the definition of extraterritoriality and its effects on the
sovereignty of other nations).
24
See infra Part II.B (discussing the development of extraterritoriality and the effect that
Morrison may have on such application).
25
See infra Part II.C (discussing the current state of extraterritoriality and the unclear
effect of Morrison on Bowman and the treatment of criminal statutes).
19
20
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A. The Precise Meaning of Extraterritoriality and the Issue of Statutory
Construction
A law is extraterritorial when it regulates activities beyond a nation’s
borders.26 Congress has the ability to explicitly construct laws to apply
extraterritorially; however, extraterritoriality is problematic when a
statute is silent on the issue.27 The general relationship between
extraterritoriality and national sovereignty is complex, and courts have
yet to find a uniformed balance.28 A state’s sovereignty is built on the
idea of autonomy and the ability to regulate conduct within its borders.29
Extraterritoriality often involves an invasion of sovereignty, resulting in
strained relations between states.30 The seriousness of the crime, even if

26
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 123 (defining the difference between territorial and
extraterritorial laws). Extraterritorial laws regulate conduct outside of a nation-state’s
borders, regardless of whether or not an offense was committed by a national or an alien.
Id. Extraterritoriality transforms laws from national to international in nature. See also
Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 127–28 (2007)
(discussing the relationship between prescriptive jurisdiction and international law).
27
Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49. Determining the territorial scope of a statute is
problematic when a law is geoambiguous or lacks content indicating extraterritorial
applicability. See id. (noting that courts sometimes allow U.S. law to apply extraterritorially
even without explicit statutory language or history). Nevertheless, even when a statute
explicitly contains language allowing for extraterritorial application, prescription, and
enforcement, it may still violate international law if adequate jurisdiction is lacking.
Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 291 (1982).
28
Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (noting
that extraterritorial application of laws invades the rights of other nations, thus denying
those nations complete sovereignty), with United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 494 (9th
Cir. 1987) (stating that extraterritoriality can be used by the United States as a legitimate
means of protecting the country). See also Meyer, supra note 8, at 123–24 (discussing how
the extraterritorial regulation or prohibition of conduct affects more than just the nation
prescribing the regulation or prohibition).
29
Meyer, supra note 8, at 121–22. Territorial jurisdiction is a source of authority for
nations applying legal rules to govern conduct within their borders. Id. at 123. Territorial
jurisdiction is the right of every sovereign nation. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”). No nation can regulate conduct of
another nation without explicit consent. Meyer, supra note 8, at 131.
30
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1025 (noting that extraterritoriality can disrupt relations
with other nations, especially when there is a conflict of laws); see United States v. Mitchell,
553 F.2d 996, 1003–05 (5th Cir. 1977) (declining to extend the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972 extraterritorially because doing so would regulate the sovereign territory and
resource development of other states).
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it explicitly targets a particular nation, does not necessarily alleviate such
tensions.31
Theories that stress the importance of sovereignty insist that
extraterritorial application of laws encroach upon a nation’s ability to
govern itself and suggest that increased pressure should instead be
However,
placed on nations to prosecute crimes domestically.32
See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1025, 1027 (discussing how “the risk of jurisdictional
overreach, clashes with foreign law, and applying U.S. national values and preferences
inside other countries” implicate sensitive foreign policy matters); see also Robert F.
Blomquist, The Theoretical Constitutional Shape (and Shaping) of American National Security
Law, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 439, 448–49 (2011) (explaining how differences in
constitutional construction, as well as political and cultural differences, make it difficult for
foreign laws to “fit” with U.S. national security laws). Even prosecuting matters of extreme
violence, such as terrorism, may implicate international matters beyond prima facie
concerns. Patrick M. Connorton, Note, Tracking Terrorist Financing Through Swift: When
U.S. Subpoenas and Foreign Privacy Law Collide, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 283, 283–85 (2007)
(discussing how U.S. interests and initiatives, especially regarding the war on terror, often
conflict with those of nations that highly value privacy, such as many European nations).
For example, after the September 11th attacks, the United States sought to track terrorist
finances by obtaining financial information collected by the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”). Id. at 283–84. However, by granting
the United States access to such information, SWIFT violated Belgian and European Union
privacy laws. Id. at 284. These nations reprimanded SWIFT, declared their behavior a
violation of “fundamental European principles,” and attempted to thwart their continued
compliance with the United States. Id. at 284 & n.11 (citing Press Release, European Union
Article 29 Working Party, Press Release on the SWIFT Case (Nov. 23, 2006)). The United
States’s attempts to pursue its self-interests regularly results in conflicts with other foreign
laws, and in describing the United States’s use of extraterritoriality, specifically within the
realm of antitrust laws, David J. Gerber notes:
Outside the United States, the extraterritoriality issue has been
seen largely in a defensive context—namely, how to respond to
excessive jurisdictional claims by the United States. These problems
have reached critical dimensions.
While American courts and
commentators flail about in search of principles to use in grappling
with jurisdictional issues, major allies have ceased trying to cooperate
with the United States to avoid excessive conflicts of jurisdiction and
have turned to so-called blocking legislation to attempt to protect their
nationals and enterprises from the reach of United States antitrust
laws.
David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 756, 756 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See also William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft
Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 363, 363 & n.1 (2001) (stating that
many nations have enacted blocking legislation in response to the United States’s excessive
extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws). It is likely that other nations will apply
their statutes extraterritorially against the United States and its citizens in retaliation.
Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815,
857 (2009).
32
See Beth Stephens, Accountability for International Crimes: The Synergy Between the
International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 527, 540–44 (2003)
(discussing state accountability and encouraging states to enforce laws domestically when
31
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expanding globalism, communications, and technology will inevitably
result in multi-jurisdictional conduct, leaving some nations without
redress unless they apply their laws extraterritorially.33
In the United States, the extraterritorial capabilities of a federal
statute are not controlled by constitutional reach; rather, it is a question
of statutory construction.34 Courts have developed general rules to
analyze the territorial scope of statutes that are silent on this issue.35 The
there is a violation within their territory, especially when the violation is one of an
international nature); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that exhaustion of domestic remedies is a prerequisite to using federal laws
extraterritorially). Defendants who commit crimes are usually subject to prosecution by
the country where the crime occurred. See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir.
2000) (explaining that civilians who commit crimes on military installations are usually
subject to prosecution by the country in which the installation is based). Some laws
unilaterally apply extraterritorially to fight conduct committed abroad; however, such a
practice is generally discouraged. See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s
Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1505 (2008) (explaining that resolving international
problems with domestic law rather than international law may result in other nations
doing the same, thus threatening U.S. interests). Absent territorial or national link,
unilateral application of one nation’s law into another state’s territory via prescriptive
jurisdiction is a violation of international law. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of
Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 153 (2006).
33
See Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (2011) (noting that extraterritoriality
may be a legitimate means of serving state and non-state interests in “an age of terrorism,
international business, and globalization”); Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The
Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 1, 8–11, 45 (2007) (discussing how social and technological advancements
result in an increasingly necessary use of extraterritoriality); Meyer, supra note 8, at 112–13
(suggesting that extraterritoriality is an appropriate means of battling emerging and
evolving crimes); see also United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374–75 (D. Conn.
2001) (holding that federal laws prohibiting hackers from targeting U.S. computer systems
applied extraterritorially to non-nationals acting outside of the United States).
34
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7. Congress undoubtedly has the ability to enforce its laws
beyond the borders of the United States. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991). To determine whether Congress exercised such authority, courts must look
at the statutory construction of the laws. Id.
35
See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7 (“[A] statute will be construed to have only territorial
application unless there is a clear indication of some broader intent.”) (footnote omitted).
Several statutes contain explicit language allowing for extraterritoriality. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 175 (2006) (prescribing “extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction” over developing or
stockpiling biological weapons); 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2006) (prescribing “extraterritorial
Federal jurisdiction” over acts of retaliation against witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (2006)
(explicitly prescribing “extraterritorial jurisdiction” to crimes of assassinating, kidnapping,
or assaulting the President or presidential staff members); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006)
(prescribing “extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction” over the crime of providing material
support or resources to terrorist organizations). Such specific language is not always
required for a statute to be extraterritorial, and Congress often fashions the extraterritorial
reach of a statute meticulously. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (explicitly conditioning
extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of violence at international airports, such as when the
offense took place in the United States, the offender or victim was a national, or when the
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first general rule of statutory construction holds that a statute only
applies domestically unless a broader intent is clearly indicated.36 The
second rule states that the nature and purpose of a statute may indicate
whether Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially.37
Finally, the last general rule holds that a statute may not be interpreted
as being inconsistent with international law unless contrary intent is
clearly indicated by Congress.38
Determining whether a statute is consistent with international law
requires further analysis.39 To ensure that an interpretation is consistent
with international law, courts commonly look to customary principles to
resolve the issue of extraterritoriality.40 The United States generally
offender is found within the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006) (explicitly prescribing
“extraterritorial jurisdiction” to crimes of assassinating, kidnapping, or assaulting members
of the Supreme Court or Congress).
36
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7. This is essentially a clear statement rule approach to the
presumption against extraterritoriality. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (“[U]nless a contrary
intent appears, [federal laws are] meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.”).
37
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 7. For example, crimes such as smuggling are interpreted to
imply extraterritorial application, because “smuggling by its very nature involves foreign
countries.” Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1967). This rule was first
clearly announced in United States v. Bowman. 260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922) (“The necessary
locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by
the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power
and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations.”).
38
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 8. This principle, referred to as the Charming Betsy canon, states
that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Nevertheless, the United States is not constrained
by international law. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008) (holding that
decisions made by the International Court of Justice are not controlling or “enforceable
domestic law”); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
international law is not controlling when there is an existing U.S. law that is conflicting);
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that U.S. law is not
subordinate to international customary law). However, the United States’s approach
towards international law gives the impression that it is extremely limiting with regards to
combating illegal conduct that occurs beyond its borders; however, international law is
often more flexible and applicable, and the denial of such principles can be seen as a form
self-restraint. Colangelo, supra note 26, at 122–23.
39
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9. “International law supports rather than dictates decisions in
the area of the overseas application of American law.” Id. Additionally, “[n]either
Congress nor the courts are bound to the dictates of international law when enacting or
interpreting statutes” prescribing extraterritorial application. Id. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86
(“If [Congress] chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United
States, in excess of the limits posed by international law.” (quoting United States v. PintoMejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2nd Cir. 1983))).
40
See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9 (explaining that Congress looks to international law when
it evaluates the policy consideration associated with legislation that may have international
considerations). In defining customary international law, nations look to customs, usage,
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utilizes five principles of international law to address public policy
considerations and national interests when determining whether a
statute applies extraterritorially.41 The first national interest is referred to
as the “territorial principle,” which allows domestic laws to apply to
conduct that occurs within a nation’s geographical boundaries, including
its territorial waters.42 The second interest is the “nationality principle,”
which allows for laws to apply extraterritorially to the conduct of its
citizens while abroad.43 The third interest, the “effects principle,” allows
and treaties of civilized nations. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733–34 (2004)). Customary
international law develops through customs and practices among nations and not existing
norms or judicial decisions. Id. at 140–41. “Repeated violations of a rule of customary
international law by a critical mass of states can modify or eliminate the rule.” Note, The
Offences Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2378, 2381 (2005) (footnote
omitted). Unilateral recognition of new norms of international customary law could
potentially create friction among nations and is not universally accepted. Id. at 2381–82.
Certain principles of international law allow for extraterritorial application of domestic
laws despite a conflict of laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 403(3) (1987) (stating that when there is a conflict of laws, deference is given to the state
whose interest is greater). International law stresses that certain international principles
are legal obligations. Id. § 102(2). Customary international law is generally fostered by
democracies. Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are
Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 321 (1999).
41
See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9 (providing the five principles that the United States uses
in addressing these issues). The segmenting of national interests into five specific
categories was first discussed in a 1935 Harvard Law School study. Id. While the five
principles of international law can be used as interpretative guides to finding
extraterritoriality, “[t]hey cannot overcome a clear expression of Congressional intent to the
contrary.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33658, FEDERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 6 (2006) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has used the international principles to determine that it is within the
national interest of the government to protect itself from conduct that may have harmful
effects on the United States. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. While these principles are generally
recognized as a means to extend jurisdiction, many cases, including Bowman, utilized these
principles to interpret the extraterritorial reach of laws. Id. at 98–100; see Chua Han Mow v.
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Extraterritorial application of penal laws
may be justified under any one of the five principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing
United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976))).
42
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9–10 (discussing the territorial principle of international law,
which allows for extraterritorial application of federal laws to crimes that may have an
effect within the United States); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402
(recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct within or that effects the
territory of a nation); see also United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 421–22 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that molestation of a child within non-territorial waters had detrimental effects
within the United States and thus fell under the territorial principle of jurisdiction). The
territorial principle is flexible and applies to, among other things, acts within geographical
borders or territorial waters and conduct that has an impact within the territory. DOYLE,
supra note 8, at 10.
43
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9, 11–12; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 402 (recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct committed by or
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for extraterritorial application of a nation’s laws when conduct occurring
abroad has an effect within the nation.44 The fourth interest is the
“protective principle,” which allows for extraterritorial application of
laws if conduct threatens national security or has adverse consequences
within a country.45 The final interest is referred to as the “universal
principle,” which allows for universal jurisdiction over acts that are
especially heinous and recognized as an international concern.46
against nationals outside of its territory). But see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, ¶ 60.c.(4)(c)(ii), at IV-101 (2012 ed.) (stating that a person
subject to court-martial cannot be prosecuted for acts committed “in a foreign country
merely because that act would have been an offense under the United States Code had the
act occurred in the United States”). While the nationality principle allows the United States
to prosecute offenses by nationals committed abroad, it does not alone establish that a
statute applies extraterritorially. United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723,
730–31 (E.D. Va. 2003). Some statutes explicitly allow for extraterritoriality under the
nationality principle. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006) (prescribing extraterritoriality to the
murder of a U.S. national by another U.S. national outside the United States).
44
Clopton, supra note 14, at 144 (defining the effects principle as “the notion that a state
should be able to regulate conduct outside its borders that has effects inside its borders”)
(footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402
(recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct committed by or against
nationals outside of its territory). The effects principle, often referred to as the passive
personality or objective territorial principle, has regularly been used over the last century
to govern extraterritorial conduct. Clopton, supra note 14, at 144.
45
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 9, 11–12; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 402 (recognizing a nation’s right to prescribe jurisdiction over conduct outside of its
territory that threatens security or some national interests). Under international law, the
protective principle allows nations to assert jurisdiction over conduct outside of a state
“that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions.”
United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33 (1965). “The protective principle
does not require that there be proof of an actual or intended effect inside the United
States.” United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 939 (11th Cir. 1985). The protective
principle is one that is evolving, and over time courts have expanded the types of cases that
fall under the protective principle. See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,
1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that encouraging illegal immigration into the United
States has an effect on the United States and federal laws prohibiting such conduct apply
extraterritorially); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
attacks intended to alter foreign policy have an effect on the United States and may be
prosecuted extraterritorially under the protective principle); United States v. VasquezVelasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the overseas murder or attempted
murder of federal employees falls under the protective principle); United States v. Ayesh,
762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 841 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that the conversion of government money
abroad by a non-national threatens the national interest); United States v. Layton, 509 F.
Supp. 212, 217–18 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that the protective principle can be used to
apply statutes criminalizing assaults on U.S. Congressmen extraterritorially).
46
DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11, 14, 16; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW §§ 404, 423 (1987) (explaining that universal jurisdiction may be had for crimes that
universally concern the international community, including crimes of slavery, piracy,
genocide, war crimes, and some acts of terrorism). The Supreme Court acknowledged the
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Universal jurisdiction allows any state to prosecute conduct that is
deemed to be an egregious violation of international norms and
obligations, such as crimes against humanity and genocide, regardless of
territorial or national nexus.47 Universal jurisdiction has been praised as

principle of universal jurisdiction early within its history. See United States v. Furlong, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196–97 (1820) (recognizing universal jurisdiction over piracy).
Universal jurisdiction most commonly applies to crimes such as piracy, genocide, slavery,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW §§ 404, 423. However, these categories are not limiting; the flexible nature of
international law, along with newly emerging global problems, has resulted in the
expansion of categories of universal violations. Id. § 404 & cmt. a; see id. at cmt. b (stating
that universal jurisdiction is not limited to criminal law and may possibly be applicable in
cases such as tort remedies); Colangelo, supra note 32, at 151 (noting that the expansion of
categories of universal crimes may soon include sex, drugs, and nuclear arms trafficking).
For example, it has been recognized that universal jurisdiction may perhaps be applicable
to “certain acts of terrorism.” United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
But see Yousef, 327 F.3d at 106–08 & 107 n.42 (refusing to recognize terrorism as a universal
crime because of a lack of consensus regarding an internationally accepted definition).
47
Colangelo, supra note 32, at 150–51. Some nations, including the United States, grant
themselves universal jurisdiction by prescribing language within legislation directing
universal applicability. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction
over the destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction
over violent acts occurring at international airports); 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2006) (prescribing
universal jurisdiction over the smuggling of goods into a foreign country from an
American vessel); 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction over threats,
theft, or unlawful possession of nuclear material); 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (2006) (prescribing
universal jurisdiction over actions causing malicious damage to or destruction of any
building, vehicle, or other personal or real property owned, possessed, or leased by the
United States by means of fire or explosive); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006) (prescribing universal
jurisdiction over the unlawful use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States
or its nationals); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (prescribing universal jurisdiction over acts of
terrorism that target, affect, or intend to affect the United States, its officials, and its
property). Such statutory construction can be found within the laws of other nations. See,
e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 896 (2009) (discussing how Spanish law prescribes universal
jurisdiction over the crime of torture); Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 888–89 (2003) (discussing the rise and fall of the Belgian
law of universal jurisdiction over “human rights atrocities”). While states have the ability
to prescribe universal jurisdiction, international law may forbid such application if it is
determined to be unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(1). In
determining reasonableness, a number of factors must be considered:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or
has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
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a means of bringing warlords and international criminals to justice, but
its unpredictable use and expansion into new grounds raises questions of
abuse.48
Before further exploring the United States’s approach to
extraterritoriality, it must be understood that other nations’ treatment of
extraterritoriality varies.49 Germany’s criminal code, for example,
explicitly states that criminal laws only apply to acts committed within

regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the
traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2). In addition, the Restatement states that when more than one state has an
interest in exercising jurisdiction, deference is given to the state with the greatest interest.
Id. § 402(3). However, universal statutes are considered controversial and are often used to
manipulate international law or pursue political agendas. See Colangelo, supra note 26, at
134 (stating that states may begin to take superfluous legal action against other nations or
individuals under universal law and that some states might “manipulate the doctrine for
their own political agendas”); see also Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International
“False Conflict” of Laws, supra, at 902 (explaining how a particular nation’s definition of a
universal crime, such as torture, may not mirror the definition of torture recognized under
international law). Unilateral prescription of universal jurisdiction can also be problematic
in that citizens of one nation are often unaware of the laws of another nation. Id. at 910.
For this reason, the substance of prescribed universal law should attempt to conform with
definitions recognized by international law with no enforcement of national entitlement.
Id. at 889.
48
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 134; see also id. at 127–28 (prescribing that jurisdiction
governing conduct in another nation contravenes that nation’s sovereignty). Such
uncertainty is in the nature of universal jurisdiction, and the continual expansion of
universal jurisdiction makes the interpretation of its limits even more problematic. Meyer,
supra note 8, 162–63. A modern example of the abuse of universal jurisdiction is the
Belgium War Crimes Statute, which granted universal jurisdiction over war crimes.
Ratner, supra note 47, at 888–89. It was clear that many of the allegations coming under this
statute were merely political in nature. Id. at 890–91. The law was repealed in 2003 after
several nations, including the United States, threatened Belgium with sanctions. Id. at 891.
49
See John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects and the
Need for an International Antitrust Response from the World Trade Organization: A Case Study in
Broadcast-Media and News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 93 n.208 (2000)
(discussing how the treatment and degree of extraterritoriality varies depending on the
nation). In addition, the consequences for applying one’s laws extraterritorially vary by
nation as well. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1888 n.72 (1997).
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German territory, except for certain specifically stated provisions.50
Generally, European laws apply extraterritorially “so long as there is
some meaningful connection with the asserting state.”51 However, many
nations are hesitant to give significant weight to the “effects principle” of
international law to allow extraterritoriality.52 Nevertheless, many
nations have recently begun to recognize extraterritoriality and regularly
use it to obtain jurisdiction over conduct committed abroad.53 With that
in mind, this Note now discusses the history of the United States’s
treatment of extraterritoriality.54
50
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], May 15, 1871, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.]
3322, as amended, §§ 3, 6–7 (Ger.). The German Criminal Code provides extraterritoriality
to acts against internationally protected legal interests, such as human trafficking, drug
dealing, certain types of pornography, offenses involving nuclear energy, and treaty
provisions. Id. § 6. In addition, German criminal laws may apply extraterritorially if the
offense was committed by a German and if the act is a criminal offense in the location of its
commission or if that location is not subject to any criminal jurisdiction. Id. § 7. However,
in 2001, the High Court in Germany allowed extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal acts
having an effect within Germany. See John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike Meier, German High
Court Decides Novel Issue in Holding that German Law May Impose Criminal Liability on Foreign
Owners of Internet Websites Who Design Their Sites to Stir Up Racial Hatred Within German
Society, INT’L L. UPDATE, Jan. 2001, at 6, 7 (discussing how crimes inciting hatred and
“capable of disturbing the peace in Germany” may be applied extraterritorially and
holding that extraterritorial criminal liability may be found if the “success necessary to
constitute a crime” took place in Germany).
51
Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto Lagodny, Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement over
Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under
International Criminal Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–10 (1991) (footnote omitted).
European nations place a stronger emphasis on the nationality principle of international
law if the conduct was punishable in the place where it was committed. Id. at 25. In
addition, “European nations generally do not extradite their own nationals” for crimes. Id.
(footnote omitted).
52
See id. at 24 (discussing how international recognition of the passive personality
principle (that is, the effects principle) is in disrepute, especially with regard to
international terrorism, and that other international principles of law may be necessary for
jurisdiction, based on this principle, to be recognized). But see Parrish, supra note 32, at
1458 & n.13 (explaining how some European nations have begun to use the effects principle
to obtain extraterritorial jurisdiction, especially with regard to acts with economic effects).
Nations recognize different definitions of the effects principle. Ulrich Immenga, Export
Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints Between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 93, 143 (1995). Since “customary international law is founded upon the consent of
nations,” it is questionable as to whether the United States’s traditionally “low standard of
proof of effects” is in fact “legal under international law.” Erika Nijenhuis, Comment,
Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1003, 1036 (1987).
53
See Parrish, supra note 31, at 854–56 (stating that other nations have begun to apply
their domestic laws extraterritorially, especially in regards to cyber-crimes, criminal
conduct, human rights violations, and anti-competition laws).
54
See infra Part II.B (discussing the history and development of the treatment of
extraterritoriality within U.S. courts).
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B. The History and Development of the Extraterritorial Treatment of Federal
Laws
The U.S. courts recognize a presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal laws.55 This presumption against extraterritoriality
is not a restriction on “Congress’s power to legislate,” but rather a means
of interpreting federal laws.56 While federal laws must not be construed
by courts to conflict with international laws, Congress has the ability to
prescribe extraterritorial conduct without regard for international law.57
Despite these common principles, the territorial scope of geoambiguous
federal laws has been construed inconsistently.58 To better understand
extraterritoriality, it is necessary to discuss its history and evolution
within the courts.59 Exceptional focus will be placed on the seminal case
United States v. Bowman, the subsequent cases interpreting Bowman, and
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.60

55
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). Such a presumption
against extraterritoriality applies in all cases. Id. But see United States v. Al Kassar, 660
F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not
apply in cases involving criminal statutes (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98
(1922); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993))). The presumption can
be overcome if the context of the statute provides a clear indication of extraterritoriality.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. However, it has not yet been clarified what a “clear indication”
entails when overcoming the presumption. Meyer, supra note 8, at 148.
56
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. In interpreting whether a statute applies extraterritorially,
courts may look to the context of the statute. Id. at 2883. Although there is a presumption
against extraterritoriality, Congress has the legislative capacity to construct federal statutes
to apply extraterritorially. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
For example, federal laws concerning terrorism and conduct at international airports often
contain extraterritorial language. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(e)–(f) (2006) (prescribing
extraterritorial jurisdiction to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(2) (2006) (prescribing extraterritorial jurisdiction to providing material support
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 3042 (2006)
(prescribing extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. citizens).
57
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987) (stating that federal
laws and other acts of Congress can supersede international laws or agreements if intended
for that purpose). U.S. federal laws are “not subordinate to customary international
law[s]” and may conflict with it, if so necessary. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91
(2d Cir. 2003); see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
international law is not controlling over U.S. law and cannot be used to limit the
President’s war powers).
58
Compare Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–99 (allowing for a loosened application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality), with Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (applying a strict
presumption against extraterritoriality).
59
See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the early development and evolution of
extraterritoriality in U.S. law).
60
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how courts’ treatment of extraterritoriality has
developed into its modern state).
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Early History of Extraterritoriality Leading to United States v.
Bowman

One of the original sources of extraterritoriality is found within the
Constitution itself, which authorizes Congress “[t]o define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”61 The Constitution also
expressly permits universal jurisdiction over acts of piracy.62 However,
the Supreme Court was quick to place limitations upon statutory
interpretation, and in 1804 stated, “[A]n act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”63 This doctrine, which became known as the
Charming Betsy canon, states that federal statutes must not be interpreted
in a way that violates international laws unless there is no other possible
way of construing them.64
The presumption against extraterritoriality appears early in the
United States’s history as a means to avoid international conflicts.65 In
61
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Congress shall have the power to “define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations.” Id. This clause, known as the Offences Clause, allows the United States to
prescribe laws regulating conduct that is considered to be a violation of all nations.
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 137. Today, the “law of nations” is analogous with
international customary law. The Offences Clause After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, supra note
40, at 2381. The constitutional drafters did not take a fixed view of international law and
designed the clause to allow for flexibility to allow proper management as international
law evolves. Id. By constructing the Constitution in this manner, the United States drew its
authority to legislate from several nations. Id.
62
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196–
97 (1820) (recognizing that Congress has universal jurisdiction over piracy).
63
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)
(explaining that the National Labor Relations Act is directly at odds with the Honduran
Labor Code and unreasonably interferes with a nation’s sovereign authority, and thus is
inapplicable).
64
Meyer, supra note 8, at 143. Under the Charming Betsy canon, geoambiguous laws
must be interpreted to conform to customary international law in order to avoid
interference with other nations. Id. The reason for this doctrine, arguably, is that the
United States’s foreign affairs power comes from international law, and, thus, the United
States is obligated to obey international law. Colangelo, supra note 26, at 156. However,
despite this doctrine, the United States is not subordinate to customary international law or
treaties. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
65
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708, 714 (1900) (finding that U.S. courts
govern with respect to the law of nations and are thus obliged to recognize and give effect
to international law); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no
nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own
citizens. . . . [T]he phrases used in our municipal laws . . . must always be restricted in
construction, to places and persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and
jurisdiction.”); see also Knox, supra note 13, at 371 (stating that the Charming Betsy canon is
construed as an older, weaker presumption against extraterritoriality). The earliest cases
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1909, the Supreme Court reiterated this stance in American Banana v.
United Fruit Co.66 In American Banana, the Supreme Court found that the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply extraterritorially and held that all
statutes are “prima facie territorial” and that, as a general rule, “the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done.”67 However, as
communication and transportation began to improve and offenses began
to “exhibit an inter-jurisdictional flavor,” the Court began to question the
strict application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.68 These
factors, along with increasing threats to national security, culminated in
the Supreme Court case United States v. Bowman.69
In Bowman, the Court found that a criminal statute prohibiting fraud
The Court
against the United States applied extraterritorially.70
recognized that criminal statutes can be interpreted to apply in such a
way if they are “not logically dependent on their locality for the
government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever
perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens.”71 In addition,
the Court in Bowman declared that crimes against individuals, their
involving extraterritoriality “often involved offenses committed aboard American ships or
by or against Americans.” Brian L. Porto, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts, 1 A.L.R. FED. 2D 415 (2005).
66
213 U.S. 347, 356–59 (1909).
67
Id. at 356–57 (citations and quotations omitted). In American Banana, the American
Banana Company, located in what is now Panama, was acquired by an Alabama
corporation. Id. at 354. After purchasing the company, United Fruit Company intended to
control and monopolize the banana trade in parts of Central and South America. Id. With
this intent in mind, United Fruit Company convinced government and military officials to
prevent American Banana from doing business in the area. Id. at 354–55.
68
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 128.
69
260 U.S. 94 (1922).
70
Id. at 98–100. In Bowman, three Americans were charged with conspiring to defraud
the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, a company of which the United
States was the sole stockholder. Id. at 95–96. The conspiracy was concocted in Brazil, and
the context of the federal statute being used against them was silent on its territorial scope.
Id. at 96–97.
71
Id. at 98. Bowman explicitly allowed some criminal laws to apply extraterritorially to
U.S. citizens; however, the Court declined to rule whether extraterritorial application
applied to non-citizens acting abroad. See id. at 102–03 (declining to predict whether the
statute could apply extraterritorially to a non-national). Several years following the
Bowman decision, federal courts began to allow laws to apply extraterritorially to foreign
nationals as well. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984)
(finding that theft of personal property of the United States applied extraterritorially to
foreign nationals); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that extraterritorial laws can be applied to the conduct of foreign nationals);
United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D. Mass. 1985) (applying the Espionage Act
extraterritorially to a foreign national).
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property, and the community cannot be applied extraterritorially
without prescription.72 Here, the Court found that the security of the
U.S. government took precedent over the security of its individual
citizens.73
Bowman is a pivotal point in guiding America’s handling of
extraterritoriality and international law.74 However, Bowman still left
many questions—for example, it was undetermined if criminal statutes
could be applied extraterritorially to non-citizens.75 As a result, courts
began to interpret the territorial scope of federal statutes inconsistently,
providing no clear guidance to lower courts or litigants.76
72
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. Circuit courts have expanded on this ruling, and many allow
some crimes against individuals and the community to apply extraterritorially. See, e.g.,
United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a statute
criminalizing sexual misconduct against minors applied extraterritorially); United States v.
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that violent crimes against
Americans in furtherance of a racketeering operation applied extraterritorially); United
States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that a federal manslaughter statute
can be applied extraterritorially).
73
See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (recognizing the government’s right to defend itself from
extraterritorial conduct, but explicitly declining such right to individuals). Bowman can be
construed to say that there is no presumption against extraterritoriality for violations of
federal criminal law that are “not logically dependent on their locality.” Id.; see Curtis A.
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 333 (2001) (construing
Bowman to mean that there is no presumption against extraterritoriality when crimes focus
on an extraterritorial matter).
74
See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 33, at 45 (discussing how Bowman was a turning
point in modern legal history by recognizing that social and technological advancements
and changes called for an increasing necessity for extraterritorial use of laws).
75
One of the biggest questions left unanswered, which was explicitly left unaddressed
in Bowman, was whether laws can be interpreted to apply extraterritorially to non-citizens
of the United States. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102–03 (questioning the applicability of
jurisdiction over the unapprehended defendant, who was a citizen of Great Britain).
Bowman confirmed that the nationality, protective, and effects principles may be used to
apply domestic laws extraterritorially. See id. at 100–02 (allowing extraterritorial
application of federal laws to conduct committed by nationals that had effects within the
territory of the United States and induced the government to protect itself). Soon after
Bowman, the Supreme Court confirmed that the nationality principle can apply
extraterritorially to govern conduct committed by its citizens abroad. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (stating that the Constitution and
federal laws have no force in foreign nations unless applied to U.S. nationals). However,
lower courts have determined that extraterritorial jurisdiction may also apply to noncitizens acting abroad as well. See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345–46
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that, under Bowman, citizenship is irrelevant, and laws can be
applied extraterritorially to both citizens and non-citizens); United States v. Ayesh, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 832, 840 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that federal laws may apply extraterritorially to
non-citizens); see also supra note 71 (exploring cases in which federal laws were applied
extraterritorially to non-citizens).
76
Knox, supra note 12, at 643. The guidelines handed down by courts to overcome the
presumption have varied widely, “ranging from statements that a clear expression of
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Extraterritoriality post-Bowman and Morrison

Following the ruling in Bowman, lower courts began to gradually
give extraterritorial effect to some federal laws, including civil statutes.77
However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the presumption against
extraterritoriality in 1949 with Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.78 Over forty
years later, the Supreme Court again revived the presumption in EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), which promoted a “clear statement”
rule requiring express language within a statute indicating
extraterritoriality.79 Nevertheless, courts continued to apply laws
exterritorially during this time, and circuit courts seemed to develop
their own means of evaluating the territorial scope of statutes.80 The
congressional intent is necessary, to indications that the structure, legislative history, and
agency interpretations of the statute are relevant, to decisions that some circumstances
justify extending law extraterritorially without any direct evidence of legislative intent at
all.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
77
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795–96 (1993) (finding that
civil provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when foreign conduct produces
a substantial effect in the United States); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98) (determining that the Sherman Act
applies extraterritorially); see also Clopton, supra note 14, at 167 (discussing how Bowman is
“routinely reconstruct[ed]” to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality and
apply criminal laws extraterritorially). However, after Bowman, a general presumption
against extraterritoriality still continued to exist. See infra note 78 (discussing Foley Brothers,
Inc. v. Filardo).
78
See 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (“The canon of construction which teaches that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States . . . is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional
intent may be ascertained . . . .” (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))).
In Foley Brothers, the Supreme Court determined that the Eight Hour Law did not apply
extraterritorially to a U.S. citizen employed abroad. Id. at 289–90.
79
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991). In Aramco, the
Supreme Court found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not regulate
employment practices of U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens abroad. Id. at 248–49.
Aramco further enhanced the presumption against extraterritoriality by requiring express
language (or a “clear statement”) to overcome the presumption. See id. at 248 (requiring an
“affirmative intention” of Congress to be “clearly expressed” for the presumption to be
defeated). The dissent in Aramco argued that a clear statement rule was too stringent and
believed that congressional intent could be ascertained to overcome the presumption. Id. at
261 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80
Knox, supra note 13, at 393. While the Bowman case discussed territorial effects, its
legitimate reasoning utilized the protective principle. Id. Generally, this is the Second
Circuit’s approach to extraterritoriality. Id. However, the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits appear to utilize an effects test in evaluating extraterritoriality. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit has gone so far as to state that, after Bowman, many circuits “inferred congressional
intent to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic
harm.” United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
The D.C. and Ninth Circuit have an even broader evaluation of
extraterritoriality. Knox, supra note 13, at 393. Under these two circuits, there is no
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development of technology and foreign relations eventually led to more
complicated issues regarding extraterritoriality.81
The war on terrorism has also had a particularly profound effect on
the presumption.82 After September 11, 2001, courts began interpreting
several statutes to apply extraterritorially in an effort to fight terrorists
conducting operations abroad.83 It appeared that the standard had
perhaps been lowered; however, the Supreme Court soon reinvigorated
the approach of a firm presumption against extraterritoriality.84
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.—a securities case in which Australian investors sued a bank in
Australia for fraudulently reporting the numbers and documents of a

presumption against extraterritoriality when the concern of the statute is not limited to
domestic affairs. Id.; see Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1345 (finding that federal law
prohibiting encouragement of illegal immigration into the United States applied
extraterritorially because it was “fundamentally international, not simply domestic, in
focus and effect”).
81
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing how recent social and
technological advancements, the increase in international business, and terrorism may call
for an increased need in extraterritoriality).
82
Adler, supra note 17, at 183. For example, historically, the United States had no reason
to apply its immigration laws extraterritorially. Id. However, after September 11, there
was a sudden interest in preserving our borders so as to prevent the entry of would-be
terrorists.
Id.
Suddenly, there was an interest in applying immigration laws
extraterritorially. Id.; see Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d at 1347–48 (holding that encouraging
illegal immigration into the United States has an effect on the United States and federal
laws prohibiting such conduct apply extraterritorially).
83
See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that federal
laws can apply extraterritorially to non-citizens conspiring to commit some terrorist acts);
United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. N.M. 2008) (holding that federal
law applied extraterritorially to a Canadian citizen for a terrorism plot to blow up the
Alaskan Pipeline); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(suggesting that there might be universal jurisdiction over some acts of terrorism). Cases
applying extraterritoriality to acts of terrorism still attempt to appease international law,
especially with regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction and due process. See Reumayr, 530 F.
Supp. 2d at 1221–22 (stating that international law allows for extraterritorial application of
federal terrorism laws under the protective principle); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 196
(finding that the protective principle established in Bowman is consistent with international
law); see also DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing how the protective principle is often
used to combat terrorism); Knox, supra note 13, at 357 (discussing international principles
that could be used to fight terrorism abroad). This is odd considering some of these cases
deny the controlling authority of international law. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91 (holding that
the United States is not subordinate to international law); Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 214
(finding that Congress has the power to override international law (citing Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119–20 (1933))).
84
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1043 (“On the other hand, the Court’s recent reinvigoration
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison appears strongly to support a
separation of powers model that preferences foreign territorial sovereignty as a default
rule.”).
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Florida-based mortgage company owned by the bank.85 In Morrison, the
Court explicitly stated that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of
an extraterritorial application, it has none.”86 The Court confirmed that
the presumption against extraterritoriality applies in all cases, and a
possible extraterritorial interpretation of a statute does not override the
presumption against such application.87 Furthermore, the Court stated
that a statute only has extraterritorial effect if Congress clearly expresses
such an intention within the context of the statute.88 But, after finding
that the law in question did not apply extraterritorially, the Court
assessed whether the domestic conduct within the case was sufficient to
establish a domestic connection.89 The Court stressed the focus of
85
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875–76 (2010). Before Morrison,
circuits varied in their method of assessment of extraterritorial application of securities
laws, and the two most common means utilized by lower courts to establish
extraterritoriality were the “effects test” and the “conduct test.” Id. at 2879. The effects test
was used to determine whether the conduct had a “substantial effect” on the United States
or its citizens. Id.; see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887–88 (finding that securities laws can apply extraterritorially
when conduct affects American securities). The conduct test sought to determine where
the illegal conduct actually took place. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879. See SEC v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (holding that securities
laws may only apply extraterritorially when at least a part of the conduct “designed to
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country”). Both of these tests, in some way,
attempted to conform to the territorial principle of international law. See Colangelo, supra
note 9, at 1080 (explaining that the effects test demonstrated the objective territorial
principle of international law, and the conduct test demonstrated the subjective territorial
principle of international law).
86
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. Before Morrison, federal courts had been applying
extraterritoriality to securities laws for over forty years. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080; see
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (noting that courts had been giving extraterritorial effect to
securities and exchange acts for decades).
87
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (finding that the presumption against extraterritoriality
had become unpredictable and holding, “Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can
legislate with predictable effects”) (footnote omitted).
88
Id. at 2883. In renewing the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court stated
that a statute’s context may be consulted in determining whether it can apply
extraterritorially. Id. While there must be a clear indication of extraterritoriality, a statute
is not required to say “this law applies abroad” to have extraterritorial effect. Id. This
ruling bolstered a strong presumption against extraterritoriality, but it did not require, as
the Court did in Aramco, express language or a “clear statement rule” to overcome
extraterritoriality. Compare id. (explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality is
not a “clear statement rule”), with EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258
(1991) (requiring the existence of a clear statement rule to overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality). In regards to the statute in question in Morrison, the Court
stated that it gave “no clear indication” of an extraterritorial application. Morrison, 130 S.
Ct. at 2883.
89
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–84. The petitioners in Morrison attempted to avoid the
issue of extraterritoriality altogether by asserting that the conduct committed within the
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congressional concern when evaluating statutes and found that the
existence of some domestic activity was not enough to overcome the
presumption.90
Morrison does not explicitly overrule Bowman; however, it definitely
While Bowman permits a broader
questions its applicability.91
interpretation of statutes that allow for an assumption of Congress’s
intent, Morrison requires Congress’s affirmative intent to be clearly
expressed.92 The Court in Morrison found that the context of a statute
may be helpful in determining its extraterritorial reach, but it promoted a

United States was sufficient for a domestic claim, but the Court disagreed. See id. at 2885–
88 (discussing the lack of substantial conduct within the United States to establish a
domestic claim).
The Court criticized overemphasis on domestic activity (and,
consequentially, the effects and conduct tests, as well as the territorial principle of
international law) in determining whether laws can apply extraterritorially. Id. at 2884.
Instead, the Court took a “purely domestic” approach in Morrison. Lea Brilmayer, The New
Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the
Presumption Against the Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 685
(2011) (explaining that treating some cases as purely domestic, even when they have
connections to more than one state, ensures that the transactions will be regulated). After
Morrison, Congress amended some provisions of the U.S. Securities Act to explicitly grant
extraterritorial application. See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
90
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. In order for a federal statute to apply extraterritorially,
Congress must clearly express such an affirmative intent. Id. at 2877. In Morrison, the
“focus” of the statute in question was not on the location of the offense but on the precise
conduct being addressed. Id. at 2884. However, the mere existence of some domestic
activity does not overcome the presumption. See id. (“But the presumption against
extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel
whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”).
91
See United States v. Finch, Cr. No. 10-00333 SOM-KSC, 2010 WL 3938176, at *4 (D.
Haw. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that, despite defendant’s argument, Morrison neither
implicitly nor explicitly overrules Bowman). The argument has been made that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison overrules Bowman; however, thus far courts have
disagreed. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303–04 (D.D.C. 2011)
(stating that Morrison neither limits nor overrules Bowman); Finch, 2010 WL 3938176, at *3–5
(recognizing that anti-bribery statutes were similar to the types of statutes Bowman allowed
to apply extraterritorially and dismissing the defendant’s argument that Morrison
overruled Bowman); see also United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 798–99 (7th Cir.
2010) (dismissing defendant’s argument that the presumption against extraterritoriality in
civil cases did not overrule Bowman, which explicitly allowed extraterritorial application of
some criminal statutes). It is possible that both Morrison and Bowman can co-exist. See
Clopton, supra note 14, at 194 (noting that Bowman “can be maintained consistently with the
Court’s decision in Morrison”).
92
Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (finding that some activity or effect is not
sufficient to establish extraterritorial application, and in order for a statute to apply
extraterritorially, a clear indication of extraterritoriality must be expressed), with United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922) (holding that extraterritoriality can “be inferred
from the nature of the offense”).
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form of the “clear statement” rule by which extraterritoriality cannot
apply unless such statutory language is explicitly found.93
C. The Current State of Extraterritoriality
The current state of extraterritoriality is difficult to thoroughly
define, but it can be stated with certainty that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is more easily overcome within the context of criminal
offenses.94 Cases immediately following Morrison indicate that lower
courts generally favor Bowman over Morrison, particularly in criminal
The presumption is even lower when criminal conduct
cases.95
93
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2891–92 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how the
majority’s insistence on a “clear indication” from Congress to apply a statute
extraterritorially appears to re-establish the “clear statement” rule laid out by the Court in
Aramco).
94
See Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Bowman
to not apply to all cases and stating that, under Bowman, “only criminal statutes, and
perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed
against it, are exempt from the presumption”). Bowman specifically refers to the
extraterritorial application of criminal statutes, explicitly stating that crimes against
individuals and their property, including “assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery,
arson, embezzlement, and frauds of all kinds,” do not apply extraterritorially without
statutory prescription. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98; see Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d at 798–99 (stating
that Bowman explicitly treats criminal statutes differently from civil statutes). Some courts
have expanded Bowman to allow for some crimes against individuals, specifically children,
to apply extraterritorially. See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010)
(finding that, under Bowman, federal statutes prohibiting sexual exploitation of minors
apply extraterritorially); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993)
(determining that child pornography statutes applied extraterritorially (citing Bowman, 260
U.S. at 98)). In Bowman, the Court determined that there is no presumption against
extraterritoriality for criminal acts not logically dependent on their locality for the
government’s jurisdiction, “but are enacted because of the right of the government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.” Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
95
The language of Morrison is sweeping. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (“When a
statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it has none.”). However,
since the Court decided Morrison, lower courts have ignored the decision with regard to
criminal statutes and rely more heavily on Bowman. Compare NewMarket Corp. v.
Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503 HEH, 2011 WL 1988073, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2011)
(holding that civil federal price discrimination laws have no extraterritorial application
under Morrison), with United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811, 813–14 (11th Cir. 2010)
(finding that a criminal law prohibiting conspiracy to commit torture applies
extraterritorially), Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 304–05 (finding that criminal bribery statutes
may apply extraterritorially when the United States is a victim), United States v. Ayesh, 762
F. Supp. 2d 832, 840 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding that bribery statutes can be applied
extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim), United States v. Hasan, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 642, 686 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that use of a firearm to commit a violent crime
against a member of the uniformed services applies extraterritorially without discussion of
Morrison), and Finch, 2010 WL 3938176, at *3–4 (finding that criminal bribery and money
laundering statutes apply extraterritorially and holding that Morrison does not overrule
Bowman). But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–747 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/27

Walsh: Extraterritorial Confusion: The Complex Relationship Between Bow

2013]

Extraterritorial Confusion

649

somehow affects the United States.96 For example, the United States
often applies federal laws extraterritorially when an individual attempts
to defraud or terrorize the U.S. government.97
Because Morrison is still young in its jurisprudence, its ultimate effect
on Bowman is unclear.98 It is acceptable to believe that the broad
Morrison does not prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially, especially
when the basis of the claim includes criminal violations of international law); United States
v. Jack, No. 2:07-cr-00266 FCD DAD, 2010 WL 4718613, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2010)
(holding that criminal law regarding transferring or possessing a machine gun does not
apply extraterritorially without discussion of Morrison).
96
See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (holding that there is no presumption against
extraterritoriality for “criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on
their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the
government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated”). Courts
often cite the protective principle under international law to justify extraterritorial
application of federal laws when it is a party to a case. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1078; see
United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998) (“On authority of
Bowman, courts have routinely inferred congressional intent to provide for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over foreign offenses that cause domestic harm.”) (citations omitted).
97
See, e.g., Bowman, 260 U.S. at 99–100 (holding that the United States may apply its laws
extraterritorially to protect itself from fraud); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d
Cir. 2003) (explaining that federal laws can apply extraterritorially to terrorist acts aboard
civilian aircraft); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that
certain federal laws addressing terrorism may apply extraterritorially); Campbell, 798 F.
Supp. 2d at 306 (determining that bribery statutes can apply extraterritorially when the
United States is a victim); Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (providing that bribery statutes can
be applied extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim); United States v. Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 201–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that statutes pertaining to
murders committed during the course of an attack on a U.S. facility apply
extraterritorially).
98
Some lower courts have read the ruling of Morrison literally, and the Second Circuit,
as well as some district courts, has relied on Morrison to deny civil extraterritorial
application to the RICO Act. See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29,
32–33 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that, in light of Morrison, the RICO Act cannot be applied
extraterritorially, even with the inclusion of broad, general language); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F.
Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–51 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that the RICO Act does not apply
extraterritorially and finding that Morrison abrogates the Eleventh Circuit’s traditional
approach that RICO does have extraterritorial reach); United States v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that there is a presumption against
applying the civil provisions of the RICO Act extraterritoriality). The fact that the RICO
Act has both criminal and civil provisions further complicates matters, and it is unclear if
Morrison would be interpreted as applying to criminal RICO provisions as well. See
Clopton, supra note 14, at 188–89 & n.206 (noting that some statutes, such as the Sherman
Antitrust Act and RICO, contain both civil and criminal provisions and that “[a]ny
preference for flexibility in criminal cases would have to be weighed against the desire to
give a consistent meaning to the same statutory text”) (footnote omitted). Some cases have
continued to loosely apply extraterritoriality and look to Bowman rather than to Morrison.
See, e.g., Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d at 744–47 (finding that Morrison does not prevent the Alien Tort
Statute from applying extraterritorially, especially when the basis of the claim includes
violations of international law); United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–67 (2d Cir.
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language in Morrison will begin to affect criminal law.99 Thus far, it is too
soon to determine Morrison’s long-term effect on the presumption,
especially in regards to criminal statutes.100 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has demonstrated a continued trend of establishing a strict
presumption against extraterritoriality.101
III. ANALYSIS
A clear indication of extraterritoriality is required to overcome the
presumption, but there are no specific guidelines defining what “a clear
Courts, in practice, sometimes apply laws
indication” entails.102

2011) (recognizing Morrison but relying on Bowman to determine that laws prohibiting the
transportation of minors for sexual purposes applies extraterritorially); Belfast, 611 F.3d at
811, 813–14 (mentioning Morrison but relying on Bowman in determining that laws
prohibiting conspiracy to commit torture apply extraterritorially); Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d
at 300–04 (recognizing Morrison but relying on Bowman in determining that bribery statutes
can be applied extraterritorially when the United States is a victim); Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d
at 840–41 (relying on Bowman, without mentioning Morrison, in determining that bribery
statutes can be applied extraterritorially when the U.S. government is a victim).
99
See Clopton, supra note 14, at 181 (“A court looking at an ambiguous criminal statute
may treat Morrison as the straw that broke Bowman’s back, requiring a stringent
presumption [against extraterritoriality] in criminal as well as civil cases.”).
100
See supra note 91 (discussing criminal cases exploring the early relationship between
Morrison and Bowman). The Court in Morrison determined that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied “in all cases.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881. However, it is
possible that Bowman simply remains to be an “exception” to the presumption. Meyer,
supra note 8, at 135. Additionally, many courts have expressed the belief “that Bowman and
the civil law precedents live in harmony.” Clopton, supra note 14, at 166 (footnote omitted).
For example, in United States v. Leija-Sanchez, which was decided just months prior to
Morrison, the Seventh Circuit held that civil decisions “cannot implicitly overrule a decision
holding that criminal statutes are applied differently.” 602 F.3d 797, 798 (7th Cir. 2010).
101
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877, 2881 (discussing the “longstanding principle” of the
presumption against extraterritoriality and holding that the presumption applies “in all
cases”); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (promoting a
strong presumption against extraterritoriality); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949) (endorsing a presumption against extraterritoriality); Am. Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“All legislation is prima facie territorial.” (quoting Ex
parte Blain, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 522, 528; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499 (1859); People v. Merrill,
2 Park. Crim. Rep. 590, 596)). But see William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L.
REV. 687, 688 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of
extraterritoriality). Despite these cases, many lower courts have continued to interpret
geoambiguous statutes to apply extraterritorially. See supra notes 91, 95 (listing cases citing
Bowman to find extraterritoriality after the Morrison decision).
102
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”); Meyer, supra note 8, at 148 (“[I]t is far from clear
what must exist for the presumption against extraterritoriality to be overcome.”); see also
Clopton, supra note 14, at 167 (“[C]ourts routinely reconstruct Bowman to overcome the
presumption and apply a U.S. criminal law abroad.”) (footnote omitted).
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extraterritorially without any clearly stated indication.103 It is not
uncommon for courts to rely on principles of international law to justify
the extraterritorial application of domestic law.104 However, these
principles can easily be manipulated to liberally interpret the territorial
scope of statutes.105 While extraterritorial interpretation may abuse the
intended confines of a statute, strictly applying the presumption can
have a severely limiting effect and may result in excessive restraint.106
U.S. courts often juxtapose the presumption with international
principles, particularly the effects and protective principles, when
evaluating extraterritoriality, and a court’s use of one of these principles
over another appears to involve an intricate “balancing” test.107 In Part
103
Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49 & n.180 (providing examples of cases where the court
ruled that the laws applied extraterritorially); see, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (recognizing the extraterritorial effect of the Sherman Act despite
its silence on geographical reach); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir.
2011) (finding that a federal law criminalizing conspiracy to kill U.S. officers applies
extraterritorially, despite the fact that the statute “contains no explicit extraterritoriality
provision”); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(iv), which criminalizes encouragement of illegal entry into
the United States, applies extraterritorially despite its silence on specific geographical
applicability).
104
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 143–45 (discussing the use of international law to justify
applying laws extraterritorially); see also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that the principles of international law may also be used to establish a
nexus and fulfill due process requirements).
105
See Knox, supra note 12, at 650 (discussing how international law can provide a
jurisdictional basis to apply statutes extraterritorially without evidence indicating such
intent by Congress). The international principles of law lack a guiding criterion with
regard to their application. Meyer, supra note 8, at 150. They are inherently difficult to
ascertain and can easily be manipulated. Id. at 150–51. Determining extraterritoriality
based exclusively on these principles could very well allow the United States to apply
almost any federal law globally. Id. In addition, applying the principles of international
law does not avoid the fact that they may conflict with the laws of other foreign nations.
Knox, supra note 13, at 384–85.
106
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150 (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality
may be overly broad and may restrict application of domestic law, even when there is no
conflict with international law); see also United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding that the PROTECT Act would be “severely” limited if it was prohibited from
applying extraterritorially). A strong presumption against extraterritoriality may actually
result in discord with foreign nations if it prevents the United States from fulfilling
international obligations. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1023–24.
107
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 146 (discussing how the principles of international law
allow courts to balance interests and circumvent “traditional territorial” restrictions of
laws). Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law suggests the use of a
balancing test in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2) (1987). But section 403 has gone
beyond jurisdiction and has been used to determine the appropriateness of applying
statutes extraterritorially as well. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839–41
(9th Cir. 1994) (discussing section 403’s role in determining that the extraterritorial
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III.A, this Note examines problems associated with a strict presumption
It focuses
against an extraterritoriality approach by courts.108
particularly on the analysis found within the Morrison case.109
Additionally, this Note examines why the current state of affairs renders
this approach archaic if applied absolutely.110 Next, Part III.B evaluates
Bowman and discusses the dangers of conservatively applying the
presumption.111 It also analyzes the intermingling of international
principles with federal laws and techniques that courts use to obtain
extraterritoriality.112
A. The Impracticality of a Strict Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Although a strong presumption against extraterritoriality prevents
U.S. laws from conflicting or interfering with foreign law, it may also
impede the United States from exercising its sovereign power to protect
itself and its citizens.113 While the presumption has been a cornerstone of
U.S. law and policy, the emphasis of the presumption has fluctuated
between a focus on the content and context of laws to an evaluation
emphasizing the interests of the United States.114 In Morrison, the Court
avoided supplemental considerations that stretch the extraterritorial
application of a statute punishing violent crimes committed in aid of a racketeering
enterprise to violent crimes associated with drug trafficking is reasonable under
international law principles). While section 403’s balancing test is useful in guiding
extraterritoriality, in practice, “balancing interests” would likely be biased in favor of
application and may result in foreign affair gaffes. Knox, supra note 13, at 380; see also
Meyer, supra note 8, at 160 (discussing the dangers of using section 403 to determine
extraterritorial application).
108
See infra Part III.A (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court’s
reasoning in Morrison, and the consequences of the presumption).
109
See infra notes 128–45 and accompanying text (analyzing Morrison).
110
See infra notes 139–45 and accompanying text (explaining how a strict application of
the presumption against extraterritoriality fails to adequately promote the modern legal
interests of the United States).
111
See infra Part III.B (analyzing Bowman and explaining how over-applying federal laws
extraterritorially violates sovereignty and promotes judicial activism).
112
See infra notes 161–84 and accompanying text (analyzing the courts’ use of
international principles and vague statutory construction to achieve extraterritoriality).
113
See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1037 (discussing how the purpose of the presumption
against extraterritoriality is to prevent discord with foreign laws); see also United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98–99 (1922) (discussing how the presumption against
extraterritoriality may prevent the United States from adequately defending itself in some
cases). Although one of the main functions of the presumption against extraterritoriality is
to avoid conflicts with foreign laws, it applies even when no conflict exists. Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010).
114
Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (stressing the focus of a statute when analyzing its
geographic reach), with Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–99 (discussing the overriding interest of
protecting the government when evaluating extraterritoriality).
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capabilities of statutes and instead reemphasized the focus of the statute
itself.115 While strictly applying the presumption fosters uniformity and
prevents over-applying laws to reach extraterritorial conduct, it is also
an inefficient means of handling contemporary legal issues.116 For
example, applying the presumption to a territorially silent federal law
that simply criminalizes conspiracies to kill U.S. employees complies
with the United States’s methodology, sets precedent, and respects
international boundaries; however, the government sometimes requires
its employees to travel internationally, and applying the presumption in
these cases hinders the effectiveness of the law.117
Such a hindrance demonstrates the restrictive nature of a strict
interpretation of the presumption against extraterritoriality.118 The
presumption restrains the United States from effectively battling new,
illegal conduct absent explicit statutory provisions.119 In a sense, when a
domestic law does not explicitly prescribe extraterritoriality, the United
115
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. The Court noted that such an approach also encourages
Congress to legislate and construct laws more precisely. Id. at 2881. The previous
approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality appeared to be more dynamic—
especially with regard to achieving national interests. Meyer, supra note 8, at 147–48.
116
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (noting how the presumption approach may not
adequately handle new-age crimes).
117
See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a law
prohibiting conspiracy to kill U.S. officers or employees applies extraterritorially despite
the absence of an explicit extraterritorial provision, because “a significant number of those
employees perform their duties outside U.S. territory”); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d
1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying a law prohibiting the attempted murder of DEA
agents extraterritorially, because it “is exactly the type of crime that Congress must have
intended to apply extraterritorially”).
118
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150 (explaining that one of the shortcomings of the
presumption against extraterritoriality is its restrictiveness). While sometimes the courts
find that the presumption can be overcome if an extraterritorial act produces effects within
the United States, this is not a hard-line rule. See Knox, supra note 13, at 351. However, the
fact that an act committed abroad produces effects within the United States does not
necessarily mean that a law must be construed to apply extraterritorially to reach such
conduct. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–84 (evaluating the effects of a security fraud
committed abroad and localizing the effects instead of relying on extraterritoriality). In
Morrison, the Court did not even attempt to address or reconcile previous judicial decisions
that did not take a strict approach against extraterritoriality. Knox, supra note 12, at 647.
119
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (discussing how the presumption can be an
ineffective approach to handling “new-age scenarios”). In Morrison, the Court noted that,
in making a determination on extraterritoriality, “context [of the statute] can be consulted
as well” as the text itself. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. However, the definition of “context”
is unclear, thus leaving lower courts with a confusing standard. Colangelo, supra note 9, at
1043. Courts sometimes conservatively apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to
battle new and evolving illegal conduct. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98, 102 (recognizing that
improvements in communication and travel make it likely that crimes will occur outside
U.S. territory); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying
laws extraterritorially to computer hacking committed abroad).
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States’s customary approach is akin to legal isolationism—essentially,
unless otherwise indicated, U.S. laws do not extend to actions outside of
its territory and are not flexible enough to do so.120 But the presumption
against extraterritoriality is simply a judicially created standard, and
“there is no evidence” indicating that Congress prefers this approach.121
It is conceivable that exceptions to this standard, such as the one created
in Bowman, are an appropriate and alternative means of handling
heinous, unpredictable offenses that demand immediate justice.122
The purpose of the presumption may be a separation of powers
issue.123 Viewed within this context, the presumption restrains courts
from acting as legislatures and unilaterally amending the geographic
scope of laws.124 The fact that Congress often explicitly prescribes
extraterritoriality with respect to some laws demonstrates that Congress
understands the importance of self-restraint when legislating.125
120
See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (stating that Congress legislates
domestic matters, not foreign ones). Laws that are silent on the issue of extraterritoriality
do not apply extraterritorially. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. Unilateral application of laws is
unwise and may leave the United States susceptible to foreign law as well. Parrish, supra
note 32, at 1491. However, the approach of strictly applying the presumption might
prevent the United States from fulfilling international obligations. Colangelo, supra note 9,
at 1034.
121
Knox, supra note 12, at 647. The presumption is purely a judicial creation and there is
no code instructing such an approach. Id. Courts sometimes appear to be more concerned
with avoiding extraterritoriality than Congress. Id.
122
See United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing how the
Bowman exception allows extraterritoriality to “be inferred from the nature of the offense[]
and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate” similar types of crimes (quoting United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304,
1307–08 (11th Cir. 1998))); Clopton, supra note 14, 166–71 (discussing how Bowman can be
considered an exception to the presumption and is often utilized to immediately address
certain types of criminal offenses).
123
Knox, supra note 13, at 386 (explaining that the separation of powers concerns express
“a general reluctance for the judicial branch to insert itself into questions of foreign policy,
which should be left to Congress and the executive”).
124
Id. Questions of international relations may be better left to Congress than to courts.
Id. But the presumption against extraterritoriality is possibly an overly aggressive
approach to the separation of powers. See id. (explaining that the separation of powers
informs courts that they are not in a proper position to determine foreign affairs, now that
they must narrowly interpret laws).
125
Id. at 396. “Congress normally expects its statutes to be construed to avoid
inadvertent conflicts with other countries, to address domestic concerns, and to respect the
separation of powers in the U.S. government.” Id. For example, in United States v. Azeem,
the Second Circuit stated, “In general, congressional consideration of an issue in one
context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes implies that Congress intends to
include that issue only where it has so indicated.” 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added) (citing United States v. Diaz, 712 F.2d 36, 39 (2nd Cir. 1983)). However, this was
explicitly ignored in United States v. Bin Laden, which found that, even though two similar
statutes differed only in their territorial prescription, courts are not forced to presume that
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Similarly, the Court’s language in Morrison conceivably promotes
judicial-restraint.126 Nevertheless, it is arguable that Congress tacitly
approves of a court’s interpretation of a statute’s territorial reach unless
it amends the statute post-decision.127
In Morrison, the Court articulated its insistence on a strong
presumption against extraterritoriality.128 Curiously enough, however,
in making its ultimate determination, the majority in Morrison
circumvented extraterritoriality.129 Instead, the Court “localized” the
law—that is, they treated the case as a purely domestic issue that did not
call for extraterritoriality.130 The Court’s approach in Morrison modifies

the one silent on territorial scope does not apply extraterritorially. 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
126
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (discussing the
Court’s duty to respect the meaning of the statute as provided by Congress and
recognizing Congress’s ability to prescribe laws extraterritorially when such language is
provided).
127
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 148 (discussing the frequency of extraterritoriality
interpretation and postulating that Congress may leave such interpretation to the courts).
It might be presumed that a court’s interpretation of the territorial reach of a statute is valid
unless Congress actively amends the reach of the statute in question following a judgment.
See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65, 1871 (June 25, 2010) (extending extraterritoriality to some
provisions of the U.S. Securities Act following the court’s ruling in Morrison); Frank, 599
F.3d at 1232 (“Congress has . . . amended its laws to allow for extraterritorial application
when it has discovered loopholes in its statutory scheme.” (citing Baker, 609 F.2d at 137–
38)); Clopton, supra note 14, 153 n.74 (discussing how Title VII was amended to apply
extraterritorially after the Supreme Court’s decision in Aramco).
128
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78. A strict presumption against extraterritoriality was by
no means a new development for the Court. See supra note 101 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s continued endorsement of a presumption against extraterritoriality). The Court in
Morrison attempted to avoid creating a “clear statement” rule and stated that a law need
not say “this law applies abroad” in order to apply extraterritorially. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2883. In interpreting the territorial reach of a law, “context can be consulted as well.” Id.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, strongly disagreed with the majority’s holding
that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none,” going so far as to refer to it as “dictum.” Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Stevens stated that, in interpreting whether a law applies extraterritorially, “evidence
legitimately encompasses more than the enacted text.” Id. Even though the majority
disputed Stevens’s claim, it failed to elaborate on how instructive context actually is.
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1043. In order to provide full clarity, the inclusion of language
such as “this law applies abroad” may actually be much more constructive to interpreting
extraterritoriality. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. It is not uncommon to find such language
located within the text of some statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2006) (prescribing
extraterritorial jurisdiction to terrorist acts transcending national boundaries).
129
See Dodge, supra note 101, at 693 (explaining how Morrison refocused “the
presumption against extraterritoriality on the location of the effects”).
130
Id. at 691. In his article, Dodge notes that, since Congress is concerned primarily with
domestic conditions, focusing a statute domestically makes logical sense. Id. This
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the focus of the act from one that emphasizes its extraterritorial nature to
one that emphasizes domestic repercussions.131 In evaluating domestic
repercussions, the Court utilized an effects test.132 By relying on
domestic effects to avoid extraterritoriality, the Court resurrected “an
outdated private international law approach,” which has been “largely
abandoned for its reliance on the formalist fiction that multijurisdictional claims can be ‘localized’ to a single territory.”133 This
approach allows federal laws to apply extraterritorially without reliance
on any extraterritorial indication, so long as courts focus on the domestic
effects of the act.134
approach essentially waives the presumption, resulting in what appears to be localization
and an attempt to avoid a conflict of laws. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080.
131
Dodge, supra note 101, at 690. Despite the presence of foreign activity within this case,
the Court took a strictly domestic approach. Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685.
132
See Dodge, supra note 101, at 692 (“Morrison substituted a narrower effects test that
turns solely on the location of the specific transaction affected by the fraud.”) (footnote
omitted). In Morrison, the Court criticized the Second Circuit for utilizing an effects test to
find extraterritoriality; however, in its analysis, the Court also used an effects test to
determine whether the law could apply domestically. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–81
(criticizing lower courts for attempting to discern Congressional intent of extraterritoriality
by using the effects test without “put[ting] forward a textual or even extratextual basis for
these tests”). To comprehend the Court’s reasoning, it must be understood that the effects
test used by the Second Circuit was, according to the majority in Morrison, vague and
unpredictable and forced courts to combine effects and then weigh them against the United
States’s interests. Dodge, supra note 101, 691–92.
133
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1040. Instead of applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Court simply localized the effects. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881–84.
Such localization is “reminiscent of the traditional approach to conflict of laws”; however,
there was no conflict of laws issue in Morrison. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1080 (footnote
omitted); see also Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685 & n.152 (discussing how this particular
approach of localization is an archaic means of avoiding conflict of laws by focusing solely
on the domestic aspect of the case and relying on this focus to exclude other pertinent
factors). It should be recognized that past multijurisdictional cases that have utilized the
effects test at least recognized that the statute in question was in fact being used in an
extraterritorial manner. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993)
(finding that civil provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when an act has
substantial effects within the United States); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04
(1993) (finding that a federal tort law did not apply extraterritorially because it had no
domestic effect); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–100 (1922) (finding that a statute
prohibiting conspiracies to defraud the United States applies extraterritorially to foreign
conduct that has an effect within the United States).
134
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045. Morrison communicates that Courts can avoid
conflicts of law and the presumption of extraterritoriality by simply focusing on the local
effects of the crime. Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 685. This approach now allows domestic
laws to regulate international conduct and allows extraterritoriality without expressly
stating so. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46. In essence, this approach promotes the
practice of ignoring extraterritoriality as long as the effects principle applies. Dodge, supra
note 101, at 690–92. In her assessment of the Court’s emphasis on the focus of statutes in
Morrison, Lea Brilmayer notes:
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On its face, localization allows courts to avoid the issue of
extraterritoriality altogether; however, in practice, this approach is not an
adequate means of handling legitimate international conflicts of law and
discord among nations.135 To put it bluntly, if a law is being used to
prosecute effects or conduct that occurs abroad, it is being used
Instead of
extraterritorially, regardless of its domestic effects.136
promoting predictability and uniformity, Morrison promotes the use of
judicial loopholes and creativity to avoid extraterritoriality.137 Under
Morrison, courts can now determine whether a law applies
extraterritorially and consider whether the conduct in question has any
effect within the United States, thus giving courts “two bites at the
apple.”138

Rather than undertaking a thankless (and probably fruitless) search for
indications about what Congress wanted, a court need only decide that
the presumption against extraterritoriality is inapplicable because the
“focus” of the substantive law in question is something that took place
in the United States. The irony is that the evidentiary standard needed
to invoke the loophole [to avoid the presumption against
extraterritoriality]—which no one pretends has been authorized by
Congress—is considerably lower than the evidentiary standard needed
to satisfy the presumption—a presumption that supposedly reflects
what Congress wanted.
Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 663–64.
135
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46. Regardless of localization, if there is more than
one jurisdiction involved, there is inevitably possible interference with a nation’s
sovereignty or conflict of law. Id. Applying a law extraterritorially and utilizing principles
of international law to achieve such application may be preferable because this approach
directly conforms to international law. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that laws should be construed in a manner
that is compatible with and does not violate international law). But see supra note 39
(discussing how the United States is neither constrained nor subordinate to international
law).
136
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 123 (“[A] law is extraterritorial if it governs acts that occur
outside the nation-state’s borders, even if committed by the nation’s own citizens.”)
(footnote omitted). Simply localizing a crime does not suspend the reality that a law is
being used extraterritorially. Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1040; see also Brilmayer, supra note
89, at 685 & n.152 (discussing how localization is an archaic means of attempting to avoid
conflict of laws).
137
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045–46; see Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 667–68 (explaining
that the effects test gives rise to “judicial creativity” because it allows courts to shift their
analysis onto the “focus” of the law).
138
Brilmayer, supra note 89, at 663. Morrison appears to make it easier for courts to base
their interpretation of the geographic scope of a statute on judicially created concepts
rather than on the intentions of Congress. Id. at 663–64; see Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1045
(discussing how the creativity of the Court in Morrison gives lower courts multiple means
of applying laws extraterritorially without explicitly stating so).
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Nevertheless, Morrison, read narrowly, reasserts domestic borders to
territorially ambiguous laws.139 But the pressing necessity of such a
reassertion is suspect—especially when, before Morrison, courts were
applying § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (the statute in question in
Morrison) extraterritorially for forty years.140 Surely forty years of such
an application qualifies as tacit consent from Congress.141 In fact,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, Congress amended
the U.S. Securities Act to expressly allow extraterritorial application of
some sections.142 The blanket approach of a presumption against
extraterritoriality significantly curbs the application of laws and prevents
the United States from taking part in the international legal
More importantly, the presumption often fails to
community.143
effectively promote modern legal concerns of the United States, such as
terrorism, economic crimes, and cyber crimes.144 A loosened approach to
the presumption against extraterritoriality would more adequately bring
such acts to justice.145

Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1026.
Id. at 1080; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (declaring that § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act applies extraterritorially).
141
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2890–91 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how Congress’s
failure to reject courts’ extraterritorial interpretation of securities laws amounted to tacit
approval); Knox, supra note 13, at 385 (discussing how, if courts interpret a statute in a
manner inconsistent with Congress’s intent, Congress would assuredly overrule courts by
amending the statute).
142
See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65, 1871 (2010) (June 25, 2010) (extending extraterritoriality to
some provisions of the U.S. Securities Act following the court’s ruling in Morrison).
143
See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1036–37 (discussing how the blanket approach to the
presumption does not help achieve U.S. interests). One of the most damaging effects of
Morrison is that it declares that the blanket presumption against extraterritoriality exists
“regardless of whether there is a risk of” conflict of laws. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78.
Now, the only existing justification for the presumption is that Congress normally
legislates with regard to domestic issues. Dodge, supra note 101, at 688–89.
144
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 113–14 (noting how the presumption approach may not
adequately handle new-age crimes).
145
See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on the
exception to a presumption against extraterritoriality in Bowman to apply a statute
criminalizing conspiracies to attack commercial aircraft extraterritorially); United States v.
Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 374–75 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying a statute criminalizing cyber
fraud extraterritorially); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(relying on Bowman to apply a statute prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction
extraterritorially regardless of the actor’s nationality).
139
140

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/27

Walsh: Extraterritorial Confusion: The Complex Relationship Between Bow

2013]

Extraterritorial Confusion

659

B. Manipulating Statutory Construction to Create Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality can be just as problematic as the presumption
against it.146 In exercising extraterritoriality, courts generally examine
the construction and nature of the statute, public policy implications, and
the principles of international law.147 This practice began with Bowman,
and following this decision the floodgates began to slowly open and
other courts began to find extraterritorial language within statutory
construction.148 Subsequent cases expanded Bowman, and criminal
statutes were generally more likely to be granted extraterritorial reach.149
In Bowman, the Court recognized that a strict adherence to a
presumption against extraterritoriality is inadequate in handling
emerging world issues.150 Bowman’s use of international principles and
focus on the evolution of technology to justify extraterritoriality attempts

146
Podgor & Filler, supra note 10, at 592 (discussing how liberally applying laws
extraterritorially is problematic within the current global environment in which many
nations seek to enforce respective interests).
147
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97–98 (1922); see supra notes 34–38 and
accompanying text (discussing the approaches to interpreting the territorial scope of
federal statutes that are geoambiguous). These principles are utilized in an attempt to
comport with the Charming Betsy canon and to avoid conflicts of law. Meyer, supra note 8,
at 143.
148
See Clopton, supra note 14, at 139 (noting that Bowman’s use of the protective principle
of international law to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of fraud against the
U.S. government opened the door to extraterritorial application of other federal criminal
laws). The Supreme Court has also allowed states to apply their statutes extraterritorially
to their citizens if the state has a legitimate interest and it does not violate an act of
Congress. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (allowing Florida to apply its
laws extraterritorially).
149
See Kollias v. D & G Marine Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Bowman
to not apply to all cases and stating that, under Bowman, “only criminal statutes, and
perhaps only those relating to the government’s power to prosecute wrongs committed
against it, are exempt from the presumption [against extraterritoriality]” (citing Bowman,
260 U.S. at 98; United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 100–01 (9th Cir. 1991))). However,
after Bowman, courts have interpreted some civil laws to apply extraterritorially as well.
See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (finding that civil
provisions of the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially when foreign conduct produces a
“substantial effect in the United States”); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–747 (9th
Cir. 2011) (finding that Morrison and the presumption against extraterritoriality do not
prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially). There is a legitimate
possibility that courts may begin regularly interpreting Morrison to apply to criminal
statutes as well. See Clopton, supra note 14, at 181 (“A court looking at an ambiguous
criminal statute may treat Morrison as the straw that broke Bowman’s back, requiring a
stringent presumption in criminal as well as civil cases.”).
150
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 136–37 (discussing the Court’s departure from strictly
territorial jurisdiction and “emerging international law” at the time of the Bowman
decision).
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to harmonize international law and constitutional requirements.151 The
Court in Bowman limited such an interpretation of laws to criminal
offenses committed against the government.152 Yet, modern courts often
allow for extraterritoriality when the government is not the victim.153
Bowman did not excuse courts from making an ultimate
determination regarding a statute’s ability to apply extraterritorially.154
Nevertheless, extraterritoriality is sometimes determined on a case-bycase basis regardless of the territorial scope of the law in question, such
as when the statute is an ancillary one dependent on another statute.155
151
See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98–100 (citing to “the right of the government to defend
itself,” that is, the protective principle of international law, to justify extraterritorial
jurisdiction and application). “[A]lthough principles of international law might not
determine conclusively the constitutionality of Congress’s extraterritorial legislative reach,
they nonetheless inform the analysis.” Colangelo, supra note 26, at 169 (footnote omitted).
Giving statutes extraterritorial effect simply because an international principle of law could
be applicable would not alleviate international discord. Knox, supra note 13, at 382–83.
152
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. The Court in Bowman declined to extend such a reading to
crimes committed against individuals, stating:
Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults,
murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and frauds
of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the community
must, of course, be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them
is to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict
territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute,
and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this
regard.
Id.
153
See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
a statute prohibiting violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity applied extraterritorially,
even though the United States was not a victim of the crime, because not doing so would
undermine the scope and effectiveness of the law); see also supra note 72 (discussing cases in
which the government was not the victim and extraterritoriality was found).
Unfortunately, it does not appear that extraterritoriality will apply when aquatic mammals
are the victims. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002–05 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding
that the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 does not apply extraterritorially, because
such an application would attempt to regulate the resource development and sovereign
territory of another state).
154
See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 97, 102 (noting that extraterritoriality is a question of statutory
construction and finding that legislative intent must be fairly construed in determining
whether a law applies extraterritorially).
155
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (reading Bowman as
allowing courts to infer congressional intent for extraterritoriality based on the “the nature
of the offenses and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime
involved”); see also Meyer, supra note 8, at 148–49 (“Although insisting on a need for a clear
showing of congressional intent to apply its law abroad, the courts in practice sometimes
follow the judicial unilateralist approach to allow extraterritorial application of U.S. law
without explicit support in the text of the statute or legislative history.”) (footnote omitted).
Ancillary statutes are dependent on another crime and often do not contain extraterritorial
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When determining the nature and purpose of the statute, courts
sometimes make reflexive presumptions that extraterritoriality is
implied.156 It is common for criminal laws to apply extraterritorially if a
court believes that the situation involves imperative public policy and an
international principle of law can be used to reach such conduct.157
However, questions of public policy are better left for Congress as
opposed to courts, and courts walk a fine line in violating a separation of

language; however, courts usually interpret such statutes to apply extraterritorially. See,
e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 812–13 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a conspiracy
to commit a crime may apply extraterritorially when the underlying act itself applies
extraterritorially); United States v. Mardirossian, 818 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that a statute criminalizing the use of a firearm to commit a violent crime applied
extraterritorially when the underlying crime applies extraterritorially).
156
See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230–33 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting a
statute prohibiting sex tourism to apply extraterritorially because of the extraterritorial
language found in similar statutes). Courts have claimed that extraterritoriality can be
inferred from some statutes based on the nature of the crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that a federal law prohibiting
encouragement of illegal immigration into the United States applied extraterritorially
because it was “fundamentally international”); Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 839 n.4 (finding
that crimes furthering drug-trafficking enterprises apply extraterritorially, because drugtrafficking by its “very nature” is international); Baker, 609 F.2d at 136 (stating that
extraterritoriality can be inferred based on the nature of the offense and similar “legislative
efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved”); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 350
(9th Cir. 1967) (finding that federal smuggling statutes applied extraterritorially, because
“smuggling by its very nature involves foreign countries”).
157
See, e.g., United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the extraterritorial effect of laws can be inferred, especially when an alternative
reading would undermine the statute, and that the principles of international law can
establish extraterritorial application); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312
(9th Cir. 1984) (“Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any one of
the five principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833,
851 (9th Cir. 1976))); King, 552 F.2d at 850–51 (recognizing that criminal laws may be
applied extraterritorially based on the international principles of law, so long as the act has
an adverse impact within the United States); see also Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius,
Federal Criminal Statutes, in 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 8:9
(2011) (stating that a “common approach” to extraterritoriality with regard to criminal
statutes “is to ignore the presumption where limiting the territorial reach of the statute
substantially frustrates its effectiveness”) (footnote omitted). Courts no longer limit
themselves to the holding in Bowman and often “consider policy justifications,” as well as
“comprehensive statutory scheme[s],” when interpreting extraterritoriality. Clopton, supra
note 14, at 170–71; see, e.g., Frank, 599 F.3d at 1231 (finding that a statute prohibiting the
buying and selling of children applies extraterritorially, because it “is part of a
comprehensive scheme created by Congress to eradicate the sexual exploitation of children
and eliminate child pornography, and therefore warrants a broad sweep”) (citations
omitted); Baker, 609 F.2d at 136–37 (holding that statutes combating drug-trafficking
applied extraterritorially, because they were “part of a comprehensive legislative scheme
designed to halt drug abuse in the United States”).
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powers issue when they take such considerations head-on.158 The fact
that Congress explicitly constructs some laws to apply extraterritorially
and regularly amends the territorial reach of statutes demonstrates that it
is aware that the absence of extraterritorial language means that it will
only be construed to apply domestically.159 However, all of this may be
legal fiction—the possibility exists that inaction after a statute is granted
or denied extraterritorial reach demonstrates congressional approval
because an unsatisfactory determination would result in intervention.160
Courts must look to the purpose and nature of a statute to determine
territorial scope, but extraterritoriality is essentially a matter of “national
interests” implicating international law.161 The United States typically
uses the international principles of law to establish jurisdiction and
158
See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (discussing how the separation of
powers prevents courts from unilaterally amending or over-extending the territorial scope
of federal laws). “Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the
state.” Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931) (citations
omitted); see United States v. Funez-Pineda, No. 5:11-cr-14, 2011 WL 5024364, at *9 n.7 (D.
Vt. Oct. 20, 2011) (“It is the legislatures, not the courts, which are tasked with making the
public policy determination of whether certain conduct constitutes a crime.”) (citations
omitted); see also Blomquist, supra note 31, at 452–53 (discussing how courts often face
problems of “knowledge,” “conduct,” and “governance” when reviewing national security
laws and policy making).
159
See supra note 127 (discussing amendments expanding the territorial scope of some
statutes). The Supreme Court presumes that Congress is aware of the Court’s decisions.
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–99 (1979) (“[I]t is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important
precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be
interpreted in conformity with them.”). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337 n.12 (1991) (stating that the
same cannot be said of lower court decisions and noting that Congress is usually unaware
of many of them). If this is true, then Congress should be aware of the Supreme Court’s
consistent preservation of a presumption against extraterritoriality and therefore legislate
with this in mind. See supra note 101 (listing Supreme Court cases over the last 100 years
that consistently refer to the presumption against extraterritoriality). Congress’s insistence
on including extraterritorial language in some statutes, but not others, is further indication
that Congress understands how courts will interpret the scope of statutes. See United
States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In general, congressional consideration of
an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes implies that
Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated.”) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
160
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that
congressional inaction after judicial interpretation of a statute results in acceptance or
agreement of such an interpretation).
161
See DOYLE, supra note 8, at 11 (explaining that extraterritorial application is a question
of national interest); see also Blomquist, supra note 31, at 457 (discussing how “constantly
shifting” public policies and national values shape the United States’s national security
interests). Under Bowman, protecting national interests was determined to outweigh the
presumption against extraterritoriality. See Clopton, supra note 14, at 169 (explaining that
the Court in Bowman came to its decision by relying on the interests of the government).
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accommodate international norms.162 But one has to wonder whether
the consistent appearance of the international principles when
evaluating jurisdiction has less to do with due process and more to do
with justifying territorial expansion of federal laws to the international
community.163 Incorporating international law via due process may, in
practice, guide the extraterritorial application of federal laws.164 But
162
See Porto, supra note 65, § 2 (discussing the international principles and how they
relate to extraterritorial jurisdiction). When seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crimes, courts consider whether exercising such jurisdiction is consistent with international
law. Id. Even in cases where the courts rejected the authority of international law, many
still applied the principles of international law in finding extraterritorial jurisdiction. See
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that, although U.S. laws
are not subordinate to international customary laws, the crime at hand met the
requirements of the protective principle under international law); United States v. Bin
Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 214, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that international law could be
overridden by Congress, but holding that the protective principle allowed for the law at
issue to apply extraterritorially). Some suggest that the use of international principles
should be the nexus norm for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Colangelo, supra
note 26, at 166 (stating that, absent a nexus connecting a defendant to the United States,
international principles are an efficient means of “ensur[ing]” that extraterritorial
application is not arbitrary or unfair). The purpose of a nexus is to put the actor on notice
that he may be subject to the laws of the United States. Id. at 162–63. However, some
circuits have gone so far as to hold that no nexus needs to exist to establish extraterritorial
jurisdiction over some acts. See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that no nexus between the defendant and the United States is required to apply
the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act extraterritorially); United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281
F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act can be applied
extraterritorially without a jurisdictional nexus); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993
F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Inasmuch as the trafficking of narcotics is condemned
universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally
unfair’ for Congress to provide for the punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics
on the high seas.”).
163
See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 162–63 (examining extraterritoriality with respect to
due process). In this sense, the international principles have a dual use: they help to
establish extraterritoriality and fulfill constitutional requirements. Id. Extraterritorial
jurisdiction is essentially stretched according to national interests, and national interests
often serve as the basis for extraterritorial application. Id. at 164. While American notions
of territoriality have been drawn from international law, these eventually evolved “to
reflect American national interests.” KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE
FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 7 (2009). As a result, territory
is not static, and it “has been stretched and pulled over time in an effort to achieve national
ends within the existing international order.” Id.
164
See Colangelo, supra note 26, at 167 (explaining that international law will help
determine whether a certain application of international law comports with due process).
Such an incorporation of international law “both expands the United States’ ability to extend
its laws to conduct outside U.S. territory, and effectively addresses a major objection to the
imposition of due process limits on federal extraterritorial legislation.” Id. But this
approach can cause courts to “lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the
statute to the defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair?” United States v. Davis, 905
F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). Once again, the issue of extraterritorial application ties in
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using the international principles of law to establish extraterritorial
application is problematic and still involves a violation of foreign
sovereignty.165 Additionally, these principles, even though they comport
with international law, are so overbroad that they “are readily
susceptible to misapplication” and may be used in a manner that is
Relying on these principles to obtain
unfair or arbitrary.166
extraterritoriality is a double edged sword: while the five principles of
international law provide protection to the United States and its citizens,
they also subject these same classes to foreign laws.167 This puts the
United States and its citizens in special danger when a nation is
determined to pursue its self-interests.168 Furthermore, such use allows
judges to act as lawmakers and amend statutes by applying them
extraterritorially, once again raising a separation of powers issue.169
the underlining issue of constitutional constraints, which this Note will not fully delve into;
but it should be recognized that some courts have used the principles of international law
to find extraterritoriality, while others have used them as a nexus to due process. See
Colangelo, supra note 26, at 167–70 (discussing the use of international legal principles in
establishing a nexus between conduct and the United States).
165
See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1084–86 (describing how using the international
principles of law to obtain extraterritoriality disrespects the sovereignty of foreign states).
166
Meyer, supra note 8, at 150; see also Colangelo, supra note 26, at 168–69 (explaining that
if the international principles can be used to apply domestic laws abroad, due process
would be the only true constraint on extraterritoriality); supra note 105 (discussing how the
international principles of law lack guiding criteria and can be easily manipulated to
stretch federal laws universally).
167
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 150–51 (stating that using these principles encourages
harmonization with international laws and norms but also jeopardizes the nation and its
citizens); Parrish, supra note 32, at 1505 (discussing how unilateral application of laws
leaves the United States vulnerable to foreign law).
168
See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 47, at 888–91 (discussing international complications
caused by the Belgian War Crimes Statute). A good example of an abuse and overuse of
international norms and principles is the Belgian War Crimes Statute, which was repealed
in 2003. Id. at 891. Under this law, Belgium granted universal jurisdiction over war crime
claims. Id. at 889. Soon, the Belgian courts became flooded with claims. Id. In many cases,
it appeared that the claims were strictly political. Id. at 891. Many nations were unsatisfied
with the law and believed that it disrespected sovereignty. Id. Belgium finally repealed the
law after the threat of sanctions from several nations. Id. This statute demonstrates an
abusive use of unilateral laws that are given extraterritorial effect based on international
law. Id. at 888.
169
See Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1039 (explaining that by construing geographically
silent statutes extraterritorially, courts are able to use modern international rules of
jurisdiction to amend statutes in a way that could interfere with the rights of other
sovereigns). It may be possible for courts to use international rules to amend
geoambiguous statutes to force them to apply extraterritorially, thus encroaching on the
sovereign rights of other nations. Id. The principles of international law may be better
suited as a means to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction and due process as opposed to an
extraterritorial gauge. See Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2 (finding that the principles of
international law may be used to establish a nexus and fulfill due process requirements).
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The effects and protective principles of international law seem to
evaluate policy concerns and are the most commonly cited principles
regarding conduct that threatens the government, such as piracy,
terrorism, and cyber attacks.170 The two principles often intermingle,
and, when applying the protective principle, courts consider the effects
or intended effects within the United States.171 Nevertheless, the exact
interpretation of the protective principle has been questioned over the
years, given that these principles can be used regardless as to whether an
act has an effect on the United States.172 This alternative use of the
protective principle demonstrates how easily it can be manipulated and
abused.173 Additionally, the United States traditionally uses a lower
standard of proof for the effects test, and such a deviation from the
norms practiced by the international community calls into question the
international legality of the United States’s approach.174 If such
treatment of the effects test is, in fact, illegal under international law,

Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 33, at 22 (explaining that the protective principle allows
jurisdiction over conduct potentially harming the state); see United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (using the protective principle to safeguard essential state interests that
are threatened); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing the
protective principle to combat terrorism).
171
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f (1987). “The protective
principle may be seen as a special application of the effects principle . . . but it has been
treated as an independent basis of jurisdiction.” Id. Under the Restatement, the protective
principle and the effects test are equated with territoriality. Meyer, supra note 8, at 147.
Laws can be applied extraterritorially to reach acts that intended an effect as well.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d.
172
See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
that laws prohibiting drug-trafficking applied extraterritorially via the protective principle,
because not doing so would undermine the scope and effectiveness of the law, even though
the United States was not an actual victim of the crime).
173
Meyer, supra note 8, at 153–54. The effects test and protective principle are vague at
best, providing no clear definition establishing what qualifies as “substantial” effects or
state interests. Id. This makes the protective principle and, in effect, the effects test easy to
manipulate and prone to bias. Id. The effects test might better serve as a tool to meet due
process and nexus requirements rather than as a means of giving statutes extraterritorial
effect. See, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 112 (using the “substantial intended effect[s]” test to
fulfill due process requirements); United States v. Medjuck, 156 F.3d 916, 918–19 (9th Cir.
1998) (using the effects test to establish due process over an extraterritorial act).
174
See Nijenhuis, supra note 52, at 1036 (discussing how the United States’s standard of
proof of effects is usually lower than that of other nations and may be illegal under
international law); see also Parrish, supra note 32, at 1480 (“The ease with which [U.S.] courts
employ the effects test is troublesome . . . .”). Although the effects test has become
recognized by several other nations, the United States’s broad approach has, in the past,
sparked international protest. Id. at 1491–92. The Supreme Court has criticized lower
courts’ use of the effects test to determine congressional intent without “put[ting] forward
a textual or even extratextual basis for these tests.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130
S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
170
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then the United States would risk violating the Charming Betsy canon
every time the principle was summoned.175
While the United States would like to apply the international
principle of universal jurisdiction over some conduct, such as terrorism,
such an application would be ill-advised.176 Definitions of particular
crimes vary by country, and such a difference in definition is critical
enough to deter unilateral declaration of universal law.177 However, it is
possible for the United States to influence international recognition of
universal laws through the enactment of treaties.178 Through actively
prescribing universal reach over particular conduct, the United States
might assist in creating a norm that may eventually become globally
accepted.179
But eliminating the use of the international principles would not
altogether stop courts from applying geoambiguous laws
extraterritorially—some lower courts utilize broad, boilerplate language
within statutes to interpret extraterritoriality.180 For example, when
175
See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains . . . .”).
176
See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 106–08 & 107 n.42 (explaining that there is a lack of an
international consensus on what type of misconduct qualifies as terrorism, and applying
terrorism laws universally may cause disaccord among nations). For this reason, the
Second District Court of Appeals held that terrorism is not subject to universal jurisdiction
because international law has failed to produce a uniform definition. Id. at 97, 103. But see
Colangelo, supra note 9, at 1094–95 (discussing how widespread acceptance of treaties
acknowledging terroristic acts as crimes create an international norm by which acts of
terrorism fall under universal jurisdiction). Furthermore, terrorism is a complicated issue
in and of itself, especially considering that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter.” United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005).
177
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing how the definition of
particular crimes may vary from nation to nation, and applying a generally unrecognized
definition of a particular crime universally is fundamentally unfair).
178
Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
383, 395 (2001). Treaties may be the best sources of evidence regarding the precise contours
of universal jurisdiction. Colangelo, supra note 47, at 904.
179
Colangelo, supra note 47, at 907 (discussing how increased use of universal jurisdiction
will help define and create acceptable norms).
180
See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the
term “foreign commerce” was not considered boilerplate in regards to a statute
criminalizing sexual misconduct with minors and thus could be used to interpret
extraterritoriality, despite discussing Morrison’s disapproval of the use of terms such as
“foreign commerce” and other boilerplate language to interpret extraterritorial
application); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
phrase “foreign commerce” could be used to indicate that the PROTECT Act applies
extraterritorially); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 683–84 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(finding that broad terms, such as “any person” and “any crime” in an ancillary statute,
could be used to interpret extraterritoriality); see also United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157,
160 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating that, with regard to extraterritoriality, “[w]here the power of the
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analyzing the nature and purpose of laws, some courts have given
statutes extraterritorial application based solely on broad language and
phrases, such as “foreign commerce,” even though the Supreme Court
has discouraged such practices.181 Even when such language is absent,
courts have “interpreted” extraterritorial intent solely on the treatment of
laws concerning similar crimes, even when their statutory construction
differs.182 These types of practices have been discouraged as well,183 and
Congress is clear, and the language of exercise is broad . . . [there is] no duty to construe a
[criminal] statute narrowly”).
181
See supra note 180 (discussing cases using statutory language, such as “foreign
commerce,” to interpret extraterritorial application); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882–83 (2010) (holding that statutes that contain broad terms, such as
“foreign commerce,” do not apply extraterritorially without any further “affirmative
indication” of such application); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251–
53 (1991) (holding that boilerplate phrases, such as “foreign commerce,” cannot be used to
interpret congressional intent regarding extraterritorial application). But see United States
v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that broad statutory language,
such as “interstate or foreign commerce,” indicates that Congress intended for crimes of
selling or buying children to apply extraterritorially).
182
See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that
extraterritoriality “may be inferred from the nature of the offenses and Congress’ other
legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved”). Some statutes are given
extraterritorial effect because they are part of a “comprehensive statutory scheme” to
combat particular conduct, even if extraterritorial language is not indicated within the
statutes. Clopton, supra note 14, at 170–71. There appears to be two types of crimes that are
particularly susceptible to such an analysis; the first are child pornography laws. See Frank,
599 F.3d at 1231 (finding that statutes combating child pornography are part of a
“comprehensive scheme” created by Congress to “eliminate child pornography” and thus
apply extraterritorially); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
that Congress created a “comprehensive scheme” to combat child pornography that
required extraterritorial application); United States v. Martens, 59 M.J. 501, 504 (C.A.A.F.
2003) (finding that a geoambiguous statute criminalizing the distributing or receiving of
child pornography was part of a “comprehensive statutory scheme to eradicate sexual
exploitation of children” and was intended to apply extraterritorially (quoting United
States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990))). The second are drug distribution
laws. See Baker, 609 F.2d at 137 (holding that the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act was a “comprehensive legislative scheme” created to eradicate and control
drug abuse within the United States and thus applied extraterritorially). However, judicial
decisions interpreting these “comprehensive statutory schemes” are not uniform. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that a
statute criminalizing the intent to distribute a controlled substance did not apply
extraterritorially despite similar efforts to combat such conduct); United States v.
Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52, 59–61 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (finding that the Child Porn Protection Act
does not contain any language indicating extraterritorial applicability and thus only applies
domestically).
183
See, e.g., United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ongressional
consideration of an issue in one context, but not another, in the same or similar statutes,
implies that Congress intends to include that issue only where it has so indicated.”)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); United States v. Diaz, 712 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that statutory language will not be implied when one statute is silent in regards to
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serve as a manifestation of aggressive judicial activism.184 As discussed
earlier, courts seem to have no reservations with applying a law
extraterritorially, so long as they consider the crime at hand to be one
that carries public policy implications and national interests.185
With Morrison, one would imagine that lower courts’ liberal use of
extraterritoriality would diminish; however, subsequent cases indicate
that courts have only been slightly deterred in extraterritorially applying
federal laws.186 Morrison is often eschewed, and the international
principles, as well as judicial activism and loose interpretations of the
purpose and nature of statutes, continue to be used to obtain
extraterritoriality.187 The current trend appears to be a loose reading of

a particular issue but similar statutes address the exclusion). At least one district court has
held that statutory ambiguity does not prevent a finding of extraterritoriality if it is found
that the statute was perhaps poorly authored. See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,
223–24 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (interpreting a statute criminalizing the murder of an
“internationally protected person” to apply extraterritoriality even without clear statutory
language, because it was legislated to meet treaty obligations that were not explicitly found
within the statute).
184
See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 550–51 (1997) (explaining the dangers of judicial activism, especially
within the context of international law and extraterritoriality); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 861 (1997) (discussing judicial activism and how judges lack
the competence to make decisions regarding foreign affairs); Clopton, supra note 14, at 153–
54 (discussing the dangers of judicial activism, especially when it implicates foreign
governments).
185
See Nanda & Pansius, supra note 157, § 8:9 (explaining that the “‘importance’ of
enforcing [a] criminal law” is a determining factor for extraterritorial application and that
the presumption against extraterritoriality is often ignored when it “substantially
frustrates” a statute’s effectiveness); supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing the
influence of public policy and national interests in applying laws extraterritorially).
186
See supra notes 95, 98 (listing cases discussing the treatment of extraterritoriality postMorrison). Generally, it appears that courts prefer to rely on Bowman in criminal cases,
despite the clear language that Morrison applies in all cases. Id. While it initially appeared
that Morrison controlled all civil statutes, the Ninth Circuit has determined that Morrison
does not prevent the Alien Tort Statute from applying extraterritorially. Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–47 (9th Cir. 2011).
187
See supra notes 95, 98 (discussing how courts have consistently interpreted
extraterritoriality after Morrison); see also sources cited, supra note 184 (discussing the
dangers of judicial activism). The Second Circuit appears to follow Bowman in criminal
cases and Morrison in civil cases. Compare Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631
F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Morrison and holding that civil RICO provisions do
not apply extraterritorially), with United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011)
(ignoring Morrison and citing Bowman in determining that the presumption against
extraterritoriality does not apply to criminal statutes); United States v. Weingarten, 632
F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging Morrison, but recognizing Bowman as
controlling over criminal statutes, and using the term “foreign commerce” to establish
extraterritorial application over a statute criminalizing sexual misconduct with a minor,
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the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the presumption’s limits
post-Morrison are unknown.188 Therefore, a new approach must be
created that upholds the traditional presumption against
extraterritoriality but allows laws to apply extraterritorially to especially
heinous international acts that victimize the United States and its
citizens.189
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The presumption against extraterritoriality serves as an obvious
safeguard to prevent unauthorized extraterritorial application of federal
laws without Congress’s consent; however, the international principles
of law, particularly the effects and protective principles, are, in reality,
the governing factors in obtaining extraterritoriality even when courts
abstain from citing to them directly.190 While strict adherence to the
presumption against extraterritoriality has traditionally been useful in
preventing judicial activism, national security concerns and the
development of technology has made such an approach obsolete when
handling criminal matters where prompt, immediate response takes
priority over equivocal congressional provisions.191 To properly balance
these two concerns, it is imperative for courts to take a new, uniform
approach in determining the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes.

despite discussing Morrison’s disapproval of using boilerplate terms to interpret
extraterritoriality).
188
See Parrish, supra note 32, at 1470–71 (discussing how the unrestrained definition of
the effects test “marked the beginning of the end for meaningful territorial limits on
legislative jurisdiction”). Zachary D. Clopton, in his article Bowman Lives, posits that
Morrison and Bowman adequately co-exist. Clopton, supra note 14, at 184. He notes that
both cases relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality and the focus of the statute,
as well as the Charming Betsy canon. Id. at 184–85. When analyzed in this manner, the
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality is guided by the statute’s focus.
Id.
189
See infra Part IV (discussing a new approach to extraterritoriality that holds true to the
presumption against extraterritoriality while allowing for a specific exception to combat
criminal conduct that threatens national security).
190
See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984)
(“Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any one of the five
principles of extraterritorial authority.” (citing United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th
Cir. 1976))). As we have seen, the same can be said for extraterritorial jurisdiction as well.
See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the principles of
international law may be used to establish a nexus and fulfill due process requirements).
191
See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing how globalization and the
development of technology calls for the government to increase its governing authority
over conduct abroad).
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Under this new approach, which can be referred to as the ModifiedException Test,192 courts will first evaluate the statute based on a strict
reading of the presumption against extraterritoriality.193 Next, courts
will evaluate the statute based on selected principles overtly discussed
by the Supreme Court in Bowman.194 Finally, courts will look to the
status of the accused and the nature of the alleged act.195 This test
focuses specifically on the intended victim of the extraterritorial conduct,
and inherently violent acts are weighed more heavily than non-violent
acts. This ideal test is one that would take into account both the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison and Bowman, as well as
contemporary national security concerns, and attempt to balance them in
a complimentary manner, rather than a conflicting one. Such an
approach would consider the simplified, bare-language of these cases in
a three-step analysis in determining extraterritoriality.
Under the first step, courts will evaluate a statute based on a strict
reading of Aramco and Morrison.196 Using these two cases to start this
analysis works directly to ensure a presumption against
extraterritoriality.197 As the Supreme Court instructed in Morrison,
“When a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it
has none.”198 This holding would be combined with the “clear
statement” rule in Aramco,199 and only the specific, non-boilerplate
language will be used in determining the extraterritorial application of a
statute.200 This approach abandons evaluating the context, legislative
history, or similar federal laws in determining the extraterritorial effect

The name of this test is the creation of the author.
See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text (explaining the strict application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality).
194
See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text (using specific principles in Bowman to
establish extraterritoriality).
195
See infra notes 210–15 and accompanying text (explaining how the status and intent of
an actor can guide extraterritorial application).
196
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878, 2883 (2010) (stating that
some activity or effect is not sufficient to establish extraterritorial application, and, in order
for a statute to apply extraterritorially, a clear indication must be expressed within the
statute’s context); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating
that Congress must clearly express whether a statute can be used extraterritorially).
197
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (promoting the traditional approach of a presumption
against extraterritoriality in all cases).
198
Id. at 2878.
199
See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (holding that statutes do not apply extraterritorially
“unless there is ‘[an] affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” (quoting
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957))).
200
See supra note 180 (discussing cases in which broad, boilerplate language was utilized
to allow extraterritorial application).
192
193
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of a statute because such considerations are easily manipulated.201 In
addition, the localization approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Morrison will be discarded,202 because localization gives courts excessive
influence over the territorial aspects of an act, thus leaving statutes open
to over-interpretation.203
If, after the Morrison and Aramco evaluation, a statute is found to
have no specific language indicating extraterritoriality, courts would
proceed with evaluating the statute based on selected principles in
Bowman.204 Under the Bowman evaluation, the courts will consider two
issues: first, whether the statute in question is criminal in nature;205 and,
second, whether the conduct poses a direct threat to national security.206
To successfully pass this analysis, the conduct in question must be
criminal and not civil.207 The act must also be an actual threat to national
security. Such an analysis closely conforms to the protective principle of
international law in that it allows the United States to properly protect
itself from perceived threats.208 In order to qualify as a threat to national
security, the act must specifically target either the U.S. government or its
citizens because of their status or perceived status as U.S. citizens.209 In
interpreting the threat, no consideration or reliance should be given to
the secondary effects of the conduct.210 Admittedly, determining an
actual threat to national security is a broad guideline. Therefore, a
sliding scale interpretation must be followed where violent actions are
weighed more heavily than non-violent actions and conspiracies to
commit crimes.211 Thus, a particularly destructive crime, such as a

201
See supra notes 180–84 and accompanying text (discussing manipulative means of
interpreting statutory language to find extraterritoriality).
202
See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in Morrison
promoted localizing statutes as a way to avoid extraterritoriality and combat conduct
committed abroad).
203
See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (discussing how localization is
manipulative and promotes judicial creativity).
204
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
205
See id. at 98 (expressly allowing some criminal statutes to apply extraterritorially).
206
See id. (allowing statutes that are “enacted because of the right of the government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated” to apply
extraterritorially).
207
See id. (extending extraterritoriality to only some criminal statutes).
208
See supra note 45 (discussing the protective principle of international law).
209
For example, under the Modified-Exception Test, an individual could be held
criminally liable if he or she violently attacked a Liberian Embassy after confusing its flag
for that of the United States.
210
That is, the primary purpose of the act could only be perceived as one committed to
cause injury to the United States or its citizens because of their status as U.S. citizens.
211
Under this sliding scale, violent acts are granted more deference because of their
immediate and often permanent effects, which are more easily measurable.
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terrorist bombing, is more apt to be considered vulnerable to
extraterritoriality.212 If, based on the Bowman evaluation, the conduct
regulated by the statute in question is considered more violent than nonviolent, then there is an exception to the presumption against
extraterritoriality in the specific case.
However, if, based on the Bowman evaluation, the conduct regulated
by the statute in question is considered more non-violent than violent, a
third and final step should be applied. This final step extends
extraterritorial effect to fraud and cyber attacks against the U.S.
In addition, under this approach,
government or its citizens.213
conspiracies to commit fraud, cyber attacks, or violent acts could only
apply extraterritorially if the conspirator was a national of the United
States, which directly follows the Court’s opinion in Bowman.214 If the
conduct in question falls under one of these categories, then there is an
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in the specific
case.
Therefore, to put the Modified-Exception Test in a simplified
manner, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies strictly unless
the primary purpose of the crime specifically targets the U.S.
government or its citizens because of their status or perceived status as
U.S. citizens. If the act is inherently violent, then the statute may apply
extraterritorially in the specific case. If an act is not inherently violent,
but falls under the category of fraud or a cyber attack, then the statute
may also apply extraterritorially in the specific case.
Finally,
conspiracies to commit any one of the previously mentioned acts may
apply extraterritorially if committed by a national of the United States.
Under this new extraterritorial test, criminal statutes may not always
appear static. In fact, it is entirely possible that several criminal statutes
may be applied extraterritorially; nevertheless, overly abusive
extraterritorial application is curbed by the specificity of the analysis.
Additionally, this test does not presume statutes to be territorially flexible;
rather, it adheres to the presumption against extraterritoriality while
allowing for a specific exception. This test, by placing a stronger

212
This approach, however, attempts to prevent extending universal jurisdiction over all
terrorist attacks. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of
granting universal jurisdiction over terrorism).
213
Under this step, fraud and cyber crimes targeting corporations and organizations
would be exempt from the exception unless they were committed because of the fact that
the company had national ties to the United States.
214
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (allowing some crimes against the
United States to apply extraterritorially, “especially if committed by its own citizens,
officers, or agents”).
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emphasis on the violent nature of an act, also allows for more immediate
justice when an act has resulted in irreversible damage.
The Modified-Exception Test, while referring to Bowman, is different
in two important ways. First, it does not force courts to painstakingly
determine the territorial locus of a statute.215 It instead focuses on the
action and the purpose of the action, not the location. Second, the Test
does not grant a statute extraterritorial effect.216 Instead, it evaluates
crimes on a case-by-case basis and only allows extraterritoriality when
the circumstances around the conduct adequately meet the requirements
of the Modified-Exception Test.217
An argument could be made that such a test is unnecessary because
courts’ current approach to interpreting criminal statutes is adequate,
and if extraterritorial application is wrongly interpreted, then Congress
will provide for clarification.218 While this may be true, the ModifiedException Test fills in perceived holes of the current approach. First, the
current approach assumes that Congress is properly informed of every
instance in which a court allows a statute to apply extraterritorially.219
This is a large assumption and can result in damaging determinations by
lower courts when their precedent influences future treatment of the
Second, the modern approach of loosely applying
statute.220
extraterritoriality while relying on Congress to alleviate any confusion
after a decision promotes judicial activism rather than the presumption
against extraterritoriality.221 This is exactly what the Supreme Court was
215
See id. at 97–98 (holding that to determine whether a statute applies extraterritorially,
courts must examine the “locus” of the crime).
216
See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how extraterritoriality is
dependent upon statutory construction and is not a case-by-case decision).
217
Such an approach is beneficial because it allows the United States to adequately
protect its national security interests without being overly restrained by statutory
construction. At the same time, it also prevents courts from aggressively applying federal
laws extraterritorially when national security concerns or congressionally determined
public policy implications are not triggered.
218
See supra note 126 (discussing how Congress’s unwillingness to amend statutes after
they have been territorially interpreted by the courts demonstrates Congress’s tacit
approval of such interpretation).
219
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–98 (1979) (stating that the Supreme
Court presumes that Congress is aware of its decisions). But see Eskridge, supra note 159, at
337 n.12 (stating that Congress is usually unaware of lower court decisions).
220
See, e.g., United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (relying on
previous precedent in determining the extraterritorial reach of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1117,
despite the absence of any “explicit extraterritorial provision” within the statutes).
221
See supra notes 135–37 (explaining how tactics, such as localization, promote judicial
activism and creativity); see also supra note 184 (discussing the dangers of judicial activism).
Judicial activism is regularly used to obtain extraterritoriality, even though such activism is
often considered dangerous when decisions implicate foreign nations. See supra notes 183–
84 and accompanying text. Courts may face the “overarching philosophical problems” of
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attempting to curb in Morrison.222 The Modified-Exception Test follows
the “clear statement” rule regarding the presumption against
extraterritoriality,223 while providing a loophole for circumstances where
national security is actually threatened without relying on malleable
statutory interpretation or the international principles of law. 224 By
evaluating the presumption against extraterritoriality with a vigorous
“clear statement” rule, courts give Congress increased notice regarding
the structural limitations of statutes.225 Finally, the Modified-Exception
Test grants deference to the national security of the United States and its
citizens and promotes the goals of the nation when it is at its most
vulnerable.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts’ extraterritorial treatment of geographically silent federal
statutes has become increasingly liberal over the last several years to the
extent that the presumption against extraterritoriality is sometimes
merely a mirage—especially within the context of criminal statutes.
While this could be seen as increased vigilance, it, in actuality, is overapplication, and courts have begun to take it upon themselves to frame
public policy and foreign relations.226 Facially, the Morrison decision
attempts to curb liberal territorial readings of statutes that are silent in
their territorial scope by reaffirming the controlling nature of the
presumption; however, lower courts have been sluggish in following the
principle literally and it is often lost in criminal cases. While justice may
sometimes be served, it comes at the cost of judicial activism and the
normalization of manipulative statutory interpretation.
A strict, specific exception to the presumption is imperative to
adequately respond to emergency situations involving breaches of
national security.
The growth in technology, transport, and
telecommunications has led to new and innovative ways for criminals to
place the United States and its citizens at risk. While globalism often
knowledge, conduct, and governance when reviewing national security laws and policy,
and oftentimes they are not in a position to adequately address these problems. Blomquist,
supra note 31, 452–53.
222
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
223
See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (promoting a strict
reading of the presumption against extraterritoriality).
224
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (using extraterritoriality to allow
the government to protect itself).
225
Unlike the Court in Morrison, the Modified-Exception Test would advocate the use of
statutory content, such as “this law applies abroad.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
226
See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (discussing how courts attempt to
frame public policy concerns when they apply geoambiguous laws extraterritorially).
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requires extraterritoriality to effectively combat international issues,
generously applying federal laws in such a way may violate
international laws, as well as personal and national sovereignty. Thus, it
has become increasingly difficult for courts to juxtapose the insurance of
national security with the presumption against extraterritoriality. A new
approach must be adopted that simultaneously preserves the
presumption and adequately addresses extraterritorial activity causing
immediate harm to the nation and its citizens. Rather than the current
all-or-nothing approach to statutory interpretation, courts should follow
the Modified-Exception Test, which endorses a clear statement rule
regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality while providing a
loophole for unforeseeable or destructive conduct that specifically
targets the United States and its citizens. Such an approach preserves the
legal tradition of the presumption against extraterritoriality and ensures
that justice will be served when an actor harms national security and
attempts to hide behind territorially ambiguous federal laws.
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